Public Bill Committee

[Sir Nicholas Winterton in the Chair]

Nicholas Winterton: It is 1 o’clock, so we can continue our deliberations on this important public Bill.
From time to time, I remind hon. Members that I do not like knives, and I hope that there will not be any during our proceedings, but we have an out date. This is nothing to do with the Whip, who has been affable and agreeable, and has put no pressure on the Chair, as he should not. However, I ask the Committee, particularly the Opposition parties, whose contribution to a Bill is critical, to bear in mind that we have an out date.

Schedule 2

Breach, revocation or amendment of youth rehabilitation

orders

David Hanson: I beg to move amendment No. 30, in schedule 2, page 113, line 11, leave out ‘that sub-paragraph’ and insert ‘sub-paragraph (1)’.

Nicholas Winterton: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 31

David Hanson: I welcome you to our afternoon sitting, Sir Nicholas. These are drafting amendments to paragraph 10(3) and (4) of schedule 2. They clarify the order-making power in sub-paragraph 1.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 31, in schedule 2, page 113, line 14, leave out ‘(2)’ and insert ‘(1)’.
No. 32, in schedule 2, page 117, line 15, leave out ‘Where the offender is aged 14 or over,’.
No. 33, in schedule 2, page 117, line 22, leave out ‘who is aged 14 or over’.—[Mr. Hanson.]

Question proposed,That this schedule, as amended, be the Second schedule to the Bill.

Edward Garnier: I shall be as brief as I sensibly can, but as the Bill consists predominantly of schedules rather than clauses, it is incumbent on us to spend a little time—not an excessive time—considering what clause 2 does. I shall not ask the Committee to divide on whether the schedule should stand part of the Bill, but this is an opportunity to consider what we are doing. I said on Second Reading that this is predominantly a schedule Bill. For example, clause 2 does nothing except to bring schedule 2 into effect. I want to highlight a number of issues, which might even touch on other schedules.
With regard to procedural matters, first, when a court comes to consider a sentence involving the breach, revocation or amendment of a youth rehabilitation order, it will have to examine the schedule closely to work out where it stands, almost as if it were in a game of snakes and ladders. I would urge, if at all possible, that simplicity enter into the drafting process—I dare say that it is too late for this Bill. I appreciate that the Government do not want to miss anything out or to produce legislation that leaves a court in doubt as to its powers or to how the sentencing regime is to be governed.
For example, in respect of the powers of both the magistrates court and the Crown court, the schedule, on page 113, in part 3, at paragraph 11(2)(a) and (b), essentially provides the court with the power to revoke the existing sentence, to re-sentence for the original crime, and to deal with the breach. Rather than a court going all through the detailed paragraphs of part 3, it would be far simpler as a matter of drafting, and therefore as a matter of efficient use of court time, and our own, if a straightforward power to revoke, re-sentence for the original offence and deal with the breach could be built into the Bill and replicated across each of the jurisdictions—be it the summary jurisdiction or the Crown court jurisdiction.
The Government may be fearful that if they do not set the measures out in such complicated detail, no one will fully understand the powers that apply to each respective court or to particular sorts of breaches and what a court can do. However, I have a suspicion that, when those who are training magistrates or Crown court judges come to look at this on Judicial Studies Board courses—of which I have been on a few—they will ask why it is like this and why it could not be a little simpler.
My second point touches on some of our earlier debates in relation to schedule 1. It is essential to build into the system a flexibility to allow a judgment to be made about each breach so that the court, be it the magistrates or the Crown court, does not feel boxed in by too rigid a framework, and the discretion referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate is left in the hands of the court.
Other points that need tightening up include paragraph 3, in relation to the warning system. Clearly, it is sensible to give to a young person who is about to commit or has committed a breach, a warning that if he continues in that way, something worse could happen. I would ask the Committee to bear in mind what sort of person we are likely to be dealing with. They will not be very organised or responsible for their own lives, by virtue of the fact that they are before the criminal justice system at all. Some of them may have no contact with formal schooling; some of them may be riddled with substance abuse; they simply may not be very clever people, in the loosest sense of the word. Therefore, any warning must be clear and there is no better way of achieving that than in writing. Although other provisions deal with notices and certificates later in the schedule, it might be worth considering whether warnings should be given in writing, because it brings a little more authority.

David Hanson: I would expect that warnings would be given in writing.

Edward Garnier: Good—I am glad. I do not suggest that we amend the schedule, but it should be made quite clear to the supervisors of these youngsters, in practice notes, protocols or some other form of guidance, that they must give warnings in writing and copy them to the responsible adult. It may be that the parent of the child in question is not very responsible either, but it is important that no provision is built into the system that allows for any excuse for failure by the criminal justice system or the individual offender.
Another practical question that needs to be addressed concerns the summons that can be issued by a court for failure to appear, which is set out on page 108. We must be careful that we are not just passing optimistic legislation in the absence of a knowledge of what normally happens. If a person does not appear in answer to a summons, a judge can issue a bench warrant. No doubt a magistrate can do so too; my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate will be able to tell me about that. That power is fine, but very often there are not enough police officers to go and find that person. Such people do not necessarily stand around on the street corner advertising the fact that they are late or do not intend to appear. We must ensure that the personnel and resources are available for bench warrants and summonses of this nature to be not only issued but implemented.
Paragraph 6, on powers of magistrates courts, deals with the fining of young offenders under the age of 14. There may be some offenders of that age who have £250 in their accounts that can be extracted and given to the court, but I do not suppose that many of the sorts of people who unfortunately come in front of the courts will have that sort of money at that age. Essentially, we are fining the parent or guardian. We need to be careful that we are not just airily writing legislation that looks good on paper but provides an empty remedy. Even if the parent is the one who pays, we should bear it in mind that the benefits system might actually pay, not an individual, so the force of the penalty might be limited to some extent. I am not making a fundamental criticism, merely urging us to be careful.
Paragraph 6(4) states:
“In dealing with the offender under sub-paragraph (2), the court must take into account the extent to which the offender has complied with the youth rehabilitation order.”
That is repeated throughout the schedule. Surely, any court will look at the circumstances of the person in front of it. That does not need to be spelled out in black and white. Sub-paragraph (5) states:
“A fine imposed under sub-paragraph (2)(a) is to be treated, for the purposes of any enactment, as being a sum adjudged to be paid by a conviction.”
I wonder whether that is a typo or a term of art. Are we intending to say, “on a conviction” or “by a convicted person”, or is the expression “by a conviction” an accepted legal term in such circumstances?
Paragraph 7(2) states:
“The court may instead ... commit offender in custody”.
There is a word missing. I suggest that it should say “commit the offender”. More importantly, in relation to that sub-paragraph, surely all that we need to say is that the court may remand the offender in custody or in bail to the Crown court.

David Hanson: I am grateful for the comments of the hon. and learned Gentleman. I am inquiring as to the logic of not tabling amendments to the schedule, as they could have been discussed. There was an opportunity to do so. I am quite happy to look at the concerns that he has, but these are issues that could have been subject to discussion and amendment, and we could have reflected on them before Committee.

Edward Garnier: I am trying to speed up the process. I am hurling at the Minister a number of small and medium-sized points along with some fundamental points.
This is not an attack on the Government. The Minister need not worry; the Government will not fall this afternoon as a result of these points. I am simply asking us to be careful as we rush together to create legislation. The Committee is under time pressure, as you reminded us, Sir Nicholas. I could have tabled any number of amendments, but sometimes one loses the will to live. [Laughter.] However, I think that it is important that I chuck the occasional pebble into the Government pond. I just ask the Minister to take these ideas away. I do not expect a detailed response. I realise that if I had tabled an amendment, he would have a ministerial brief and so could comfortably respond, but I am not after that this afternoon. I am instead quietly tugging at the prefect’s spats. We will see how we get on.
There are a number of areas in this schedule which are susceptible to the greater or lesser criticisms that I have addressed so far, but bearing in mind your strictures, Sir Nicholas, and bearing in mind my need to remain on very friendly terms with the Minister of State, I shall finish on this one point. It relates to page 115 and part 4 of the schedule. It says something that we have not just a schedule, but a schedule that is divided into many parts. It has more parts than Caesarean Gaul, one might add. But there we are.
Paragraph 13 is headed “Amendment by appropriate court”. This is a perfectly sensible suggestion. If an offender moves from one local court jurisdiction to another, it is important that the order should follow him and can be applied in the new area. However, we must ensure that the communication and co-operation systems are available to ensure that this happens. Far too often—I say this from my experience in sitting in courts in London—even within a petty sessional division, things do not get done because nobody bothers to tell the person who needs to implement the thing that has been decided. Will the Minister please ensure that an adequate communication system is in place before the Bill becomes law, so that the force of order can follow the offender geographically as he moves about?
I am beginning to feel inhibited from making further remarks, for no better reason than that the clock is ticking. If I do not continue to talk about schedule 2, I do not want anyone—particularly the Government—to think that I have no further things to say in relation to it. I do.

Nicholas Winterton: Take your time.

Edward Garnier: You are very kind, Sir Nicholas. In that case, I shall just say two more things. Taking a random example, paragraph 22(5) states:
“The powers of a magistrates’ court under this paragraph may be exercised by a single justice of the peace, notwithstanding anything in the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980”.
In many ways that is a sensible thing to do to avoid having to bring together two or three magistrates to make a decision that could be made by one, but it underlines the point that the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead made on Tuesday about the need for adequate representation of youngsters within the criminal justice system. When decisions about the future of young offenders are being made by a smaller court, which is in the interests of efficiency, we must be careful that the offender is not left alone in the court. I suspect that no humane magistrate would want to do that, but we need to take care.
Furthermore, on the issue of making sure that these young people are dealt with properly, if copies of the revoking or amending order are to be provided to the parent or guardian of someone under the age of 14, as stated at the top of page 122, why are they not to be provided to the parent or guardian of any other minor who comes before the court?
Finally, paragraph 25, “Power to amend maximum period of fostering requirement”, gives the Secretary of State quite a big power in terms of the disposal of youngsters. It is not simply a question of raising or lowering the limit of a fine or the number of hours of unpaid work; the paragraph deals with the length of time for which a child can be taken away from its natural parents and handed over to the local authority. It can happen for all sorts of good reasons, as we discussed on Tuesday, but we ought to be careful. Such a power should not be exercised without far greater parliamentary intervention.
As always, I am deeply grateful to you, Sir Nicholas, for your patience and forbearance as I seek to tease the Government into producing better legislation. I look forward to hearing from the Minister either now, or in writing in due course.

David Hanson: I hope to reassure the hon. and learned Gentleman that I am relaxed about discussing any aspect of the Bill. If he wishes to spend time on schedule 2, that is fine by me. The point of my intervention was that if even moderate drafting changes are to be made, the purpose of the Government and the Opposition is to ensure that those changes make good legislation. As part of that process, we must consider the potential legislative impact of drafting changes with parliamentary counsel outside Committee. I know that he will understand that, but I am genuinely relaxed and willing to go at whatever pace the Committee wishes. We do not have any knives in the process. I am content for us to consider anything.
I shall read Hansard when it is published for the hon. and learned Gentleman’s points. If he has made valid points about the detailed aspects of potential amendments, we are always willing to consider them if they will improve the Bill. The purpose of Committee is to have political arguments, but also to ensure that the Bill is clear and usable and achieves the desired objectives. I did not mean to criticise him. I am sure that we will get on as far as possible within the constraints of Opposition politics.
I shall respond to a couple of the hon. and learned Gentleman’s points. To reiterate my point about warnings given directly to young people by the officer responsible for the order, I confirm that it would be appropriate for the responsible officer to make an internal record of any warnings and normally to confirm those warnings in writing for the individual. That is in line with the current good practice of the Youth Justice Board’s national standards for the enforcement of orders and will provide a balance between the need for compliance with an order and the individual’s circumstances, as well as ensuring that the individual understands the message. I hope that that reassures him.
The hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned the danger that combining provisions to cover magistrates and Crown courts could lead to more complex provisions. The schedule’s merits lie in setting out separate provisions for each court. For example, magistrates will need to digest only those provisions relating to youth courts. We are trying not to over-complicate the schedule, which is why we have drafted it as we have. The separate provisions will assist each court in turn.
The hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned bench warrants. I take on board his points. I accept that such warrants must be executed quickly, and I hope that that will be the normal practice.
I am happy to reflect on the points that the hon. and learned Gentleman made. In general, he mentioned a number of drafting points. I am happy to consider them in light of his comments. Different drafting styles impact legislation differently. If hon. Members prefer that the detail should be settled in a broad order-making process, perhaps we can do that next time around rather than this time. I will consider the hon. and learned Gentleman’s points, because there are details that need reflection. However, given those brief comments and the assurances I have offered on a couple of his substantive points, I hope that the Committee will agree to the schedule.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 3

Transfer of youth rehabilitation orders to Northern Ireland

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

David Heath: Welcome to the Chair, Sir Nicholas. I shall speak briefly and I will understand entirely if it turns out that my point would be more appropriate in relation to schedule 4.
I have a simple question. The clause and schedule 3 deal with the transfer of orders into the jurisdiction of Northern Ireland. Government amendment No. 44 will deal with Scottish jurisdiction. I simply wish to inquire why Scotland will be dealt with by a consequential order-making and revocation amendment and whether the provisions for Northern Ireland and Scotland are comparable. I find it difficult to understand Scots law, so I do not know whether the provisions for the two jurisdictions are comparable. If a young offender is subject to an order in England, will he be able to avoid the responsibilities placed upon him by crossing the Scottish border and, say, becoming a resident of Gretna Green?

David Hanson: To clarify, clause 3 introduces schedule 3, which sets out the procedure for the transfer of a youth rehabilitation order to Northern Ireland when a young person either “resides or will reside” there when an order takes effect. Neither the Bill nor Government amendment No. 44 provides for the transfer of youth rehabilitation orders to Scotland.
Government officials have discussed the matter with Scottish Executive officials, who have concluded that they do not wish to have equivalent provisions. As the hon. Gentleman will be aware, the Scottish Executive have competence for these matters in Scotland and it is important that, in the spirit of devolution, we respect their wishes. That is my understanding of the position after the matter was discussed at official level.
The clause provides for Northern Ireland because my hon. Friend the Minister of State at the Northern Ireland Office, who holds a post that both my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Justice and I have held—this year is the year of the three Ministers of State in Northern Ireland—has agreed to and is content with the provision.

David Heath: I am most grateful to the Minister but, importantly, he has confirmed my suspicions. I understand entirely the devolution arrangements and that there is an entirely separate Scottish jurisdiction, but a young person who is subject to an order in England will not be subject to it if he goes to Scotland. Is it correct that such a person will not be subject to an order unless he returns to English and Welsh jurisdiction?

David Hanson: My colleagues in the Scottish Executive have been closely involved with the development of the youth rehabilitation order policy and have worked closely with the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office. Scottish Executive Ministers have decided that youth rehabilitation orders should not transfer to Scotland, but that will not make orders unworkable.
I understand the difficulties of border issues—I represent a constituency on the border between Wales and England, but provisions are easily transferred over that border. However, I do not believe that the arrangements will damage the workability of the orders because, potentially, the numbers involved are small. Where such a transfer does arise, I would expect the local youth offending team, the relevant Scottish local authority and the court to work closely to find a workable solution with the Youth Justice Board and the courts in England and Wales to ensure that we examine public protection issues.
However, the hon. Gentleman has raised a very important point and I will certainly reflect on it, because I would not wish someone who has an order placed on them in Berwick-upon-Tweed suddenly to decide that they are much more comfortable living in Galashiels or wherever is just over the border from Berwick-upon-Tweed. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will allow me to reflect on that matter, given the valid points that he has made today.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 3

Transfer of youth rehabilitation orders to Northern Ireland

Amendments made: No. 34, in schedule 3, page 125, line 37, leave out from ‘authority’ to end of line 41.
No. 35, in schedule 3, page 126, line 4, leave out sub-paragraph (5).—[Mr. Hanson.]

Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 4

Meaning of “the responsible officer”

Edward Garnier: I beg to move amendment No. 3, in clause 4, page 3, line 22, leave out subsection (3).

Nicholas Winterton: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 4, in clause 4, page 3, line 30, leave out subsection (4).

Edward Garnier: As you can see, Sir Nicholas, subsections (3) and (4) give the Secretary of State the power to amend legislation. However, they do not give him the power to amend only secondary legislation or even the Bill; he is being given the power to amend other primary criminal justice legislation. It is rather more than interesting that the Act that he is being given the power to amend—the Criminal Justice Act 2003—is, in terms of its implementation, the most ridiculous piece of legislation that it is possible to imagine.
In written questions, I have asked the Home Secretary how much of the 2003 Act is in force, how much has been repealed before even coming into force and how much is not yet in force. Although it is a big fat Act, it is incredible how many of its provisions are not in effect, have not been implemented, or have been repealed before being brought into force.
That point is reinforced, or at least I like to think that my arguments are reinforced, by a quick glance at schedules 4 and 23 of the Bill, in which great reams of amendments to recent legislation are identified. There is a constant cascade of legislation that is being amended before it is even brought into force, yet here we are giving the Secretary of State power to effect amendment by the writing of his name, rather than by any fully scrutinised legislative process.
I tabled amendments Nos. 3 and 4 because I believe that Parliament should amend the criminal law; Parliament should amend the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Parliament, not the Executive, should make the decisions on how we frame our criminal law, which deals with the removal of people’s liberties and the conduct of our police, courts and criminal justice system more widely.

David Hanson: These amendments are the first of several that the hon. and learned Gentleman has tabled that seek to remove delegated powers from the Bill. The use of order and regulation-making powers is a well established means of removing unnecessary detail from primary legislation and of conferring a sensible degree of flexibility on the legislative scheme. It has been used not just by the current Government but by previous Governments.
We have set out the rationale for each delegated power in a memorandum that we published on the introduction of the Bill, and I hope that members of the Committee can reflect upon that rationale. I must say to the hon. and learned Gentleman that the parliamentary scrutiny element of that memorandum will be considered in due course by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in another place. That Committee, as members of this Committee may know, is never slow to criticise any excessive use of delegated powers. In the event that the delegated powers aspects of the legislation are considered by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the Committee makes suggestions, I will certainly consider those suggestions in the normal way and give sympathetic consideration to recommendations that the Committee makes.
I believe that the order-making power is necessary and justified, and that it gives us the flexibility to adapt the interpretation of legislation, particularly relating to the responsible officer in this case. The order-making power will enable the Secretary of State to require courts to determine who should be the appropriate responsible officer where the order contains more than one requirement.
On that basis, I commend the order-making power in the Bill to the Committee. I understand the hon. and learned Gentleman’s concerns. I hope that the fact that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee will examine this legislation in detail reassures him. The Committee will make recommendations and those recommendations will be considered by the Government, and if it suggests changes, I give a commitment to consider them sympathetically, in the light of any comments that it wishes to make.

Edward Garnier: I hear what the Minister says. It is seven-all in this Committee, and I gather that there may be other people interested in this debate who are not currently present. However, I will not disturb the hon. Member for Tooting and require him to go outside, because that would lead to a further delay of our proceedings. However, it is important that, as a matter of constitutional propriety, we are careful about what powers we give a Secretary of State.
This is the place where the Executive should be held to account. It may be said that this is a convenient and well used procedure to amend the detail of legislation, but just because it has been done before does not mean that it is right to do it again. I think that, from time to time, Committees of this House and the House itself should just check the Government, because Governments, if they are not careful, take power because they find it convenient to do so. The Government are not here for the convenience of anybody apart from the electorate of this country, as represented by us.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

David Heath: This is a minor point that I would just like to ask the Minister about; it is such a minor point that I did not think that it was worth an amendment. It is just a minor anxiety on my part. Subsection (1)(b) says that the responsible officer, in respect of an attendance centre, is
“the officer in charge of the attendance centre in question”.
Given that the responsible officer has a particular relationship to the offender, it may not always be the case that the person who is nominally in charge of the attendance centre is the person who has that relationship in care to the offender in question. I just wonder whether that wording raises any possibility of causing difficulties or confusion. If it does not, my anxiety is allayed.

David Hanson: I am advised that it will not cause problems, in that the officer in charge will maintain responsibility. I understand the point that the hon. Gentleman makes, but I hope that I can assure him that there will not be a problem.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5

Responsible officer and offender: duties in relation to the other

Edward Garnier: I beg to move amendment No. 5, in clause 5, page 3, line 45, after ‘offender’s’, insert ‘, or his immediate family’s,’.
The amendment relates to the wording in subsection (3), which states:
“In giving instructions in pursuance of a youth rehabilitation order relating to an offender, the responsible officer must ensure, as far as practicable, that any instruction is such as to avoid...any conflict with the offender’s religious beliefs”.
It seems to me that when an young offender’s religious beliefs are placed in a position of conflict as a result of the making of the order, it will, or it could, impact equally on his family. Under the Bill as drafted, the court may well say that the offender’s religious beliefs are incorporated in his wider family’s beliefs in any event, but I think that the court ought to be careful to inquire about the nature of the family structure of the individual offender. If the offender is 13, 14 or 15, the court should consider whether they cannot go to an attendance centre on a Friday evening, a Sunday morning or at some other time. If the offender is a minor, as he surely will be, the ability of the family to co-operate with the court and to ensure compliance with the order is something that we ought to consider. That is the simple point, and I hope that the Minister can address it.

David Heath: I support the hon. and learned Gentleman’s contention. It has some force in the case of the youngest offenders—those under 16—as it would seem entirely appropriate to take into consideration the family’s religious beliefs. We ought to assume that young persons aged over 16 have formed their own religious beliefs and are capable of answering the question properly themselves, but it is not unreasonable for an inquiry to be made about the family’s religious background in the case of younger offenders. I hope that the Minister will be sympathetic to that view.

David Hanson: I want to make two points in discussion with the hon. and learned Member for Harborough and the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome. First, the responsible officer’s first duty is to the young person. As the hon. and learned Gentleman has pointed out, under subsection (3)(a), potential conflicts with an offender’s religious beliefs should be discussed as part of the consideration of such matters.
The amendment states “family”. It is possible for a family—however that is defined—to have different religious beliefs within it. It is quite possible for Catholic to marry Protestant, for Jew to marry Catholic and for Muslim to marry Church of England, and it is also possible to have different emphases within that. That might be confusing to the individual. The individual who is before the responsible officer may have strong religious beliefs, and they will be taken into account. We must avoid the potential for confusion.
The hon. and learned Gentleman’s amendment refers to the family, but I do not have a definition of what the family means in that context—

Edward Garnier: It says “immediate family”.

David Hanson: I am still not sure what that means. I am making two points. The first is about the definition of family and the second is about the fact that a family may have different religious beliefs within it, and that the duty of the responsible officer is to the young person. I do not believe that it is practical to extend clause 5 to include the religious beliefs of the offender’s family. The point that I would also make—I referred to this earlier—is that when sentencing, the court has to take into account the young person’s family circumstances before it makes a youth rehabilitation order. In practice, that means that a youth offending team would have to make an examination of the offender’s family and some of the consequences and details that might impact upon the offender and sentence in that regard. If, as the hon. and learned Gentleman suggests, we impose a mandatory requirement in the legislation, it would cause some difficulties. The approach in the Bill is also consistent with similar provisions in section 217 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 relating to the adult community order. I hope that those points have some resonance with the hon. and learned Gentleman.

Charles Walker: Will the Minister give some examples in which the offender’s religious beliefs would need to be taken into account? What sort of circumstances would come into play?

David Hanson: Let me give one example. The individual might have to work on a religious holiday. It might be a religious holiday for one individual but not for another. That is one example of how that could work in practice. I do not think that the amendment is workable because there could be different religious beliefs in the family. It is also possible in these sad and troubled times that there could be divorce and separation within the immediate family. There could be conflicting requirements within the religious beliefs of the family in that circumstance. I accept that the hon. and learned Gentleman may not find such arguments helpful, but I am proposing—as I hope I have done with my remarks—that the interests of the young person are central, and that the assessment will be made around those interests and the family circumstances. In doing so, that requirement will be brought forward, but not in a mandatory legislative capacity.

Charles Walker: Am I right in assuming that the court will determine whether these religious beliefs are genuine? It would be quite easy for someone to say, “I don’t do Sundays because I am a Christian,” when, in actual fact, they have never been seen in church and never worshipped before. It is just a good get-out clause.

David Hanson: The assessment has to be that the requirements are reasonable. The Bill states:
“In giving instructions in pursuance of a youth rehabilitation order relating to an offender, the responsible officer must ensure, as far as practicable, that any instruction is such as to avoid—
(a) any conflict with the offender’s religious beliefs,”
For example, if the offender is an orthodox Jew and the rehabilitation order says that community work should be undertaken on Friday, that might be in conflict with the offender’s religious beliefs. That may be something that the court wants to take into account. We want to build the order around its deliverability to ensure that the offender’s beliefs are taken into account. If we extend the measure to the wider family, we could have a circumstance in which the offender might be an orthodox Jew who has lapsed, but the parents may be orthodox Jews who wish to see their religious beliefs taken into account. There are discussions that we can have around that, but the key thing is that the duty of the responsible officer is to the young person. We are trying to avoid conflict with religious beliefs but not, as the hon. and learned Member for Harborough has put it, to extend that to the wider family.

Edward Garnier: The Minister’s responses were brave. The suggestions that the measure would cause problems with families of mixed religion and that the Minister does not really understand what the words “immediate family” mean are bordering on desperate. Anyhow, I shall take the Minister at his word and assume that when the Bill becomes law the words
“any conflict with the offender’s religious beliefs”
will require a court to take into account the religious circumstances surrounding the individual presented before it.
The Minister mentioned a lapsed orthodox Jew whose parents none the less were still observing orthodox Jews. I do not want to get too silly about this. Let us assume that this lapsed orthodox Jew under the age of 16 was not worried about working on the Sabbath, but his parents could not physically take him in their car to the place where he had to work on that day. We need to think about such a practical problem. Whether we think about it via the vehicle of subsection 3(a) as currently drafted or, as I have suggested, through inserting “or his immediate family’s”, I do not much mind, so long as somebody thinks about it.
On that basis, and given that I do not want to spend too much time on the Minister’s response, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Edward Garnier: I beg to move amendment No. 6, in clause 5, page 4, line 5, leave out subsection (4).
The arguments behind the amendment, which would delete subsection (4), are exactly the same as those I made in relation to amendments Nos. 3 and 4 to clause 4. I have no doubt that the Minister’s answer will be exactly the same as well.

Nicholas Winterton: We will have to wait and see.

David Hanson: In the spirit of co-operation and speed, may I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments earlier?

Edward Garnier: I refer the Minister to the request that I made to him in relation to amendment No. 3, which was that I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Edward Garnier: I beg to move amendment No. 7, in clause 5, page 4, line 8, at end insert ‘written’.

Nicholas Winterton: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 8, in clause 5, page 4, line 11, after ‘officer’, insert ‘in writing’.
No. 173, in clause 5, page 4, line 11, at end insert ‘within a reasonable period of time’.
No. 15, in clause 5, page 4, line 11, at end insert—
‘(5A) Any instructions given in accordance with subsection (5)(a) must be recorded in the offender’s probation records.
(5B) A copy of instructions recorded in accordance with subsection (5A) shall be provided to the offender on request.’.

Edward Garnier: In amendments Nos. 7 and 8, I seek to add a requirement that the instructions should be given to the offender in writing. I made this point a moment ago. The Minister has indicated that the normal practice is that such instructions should be given in writing. I am not one for over-legislating but, if it helps, let us stick it in. If we can be assured that written instructions are given, we need not bother.
Under amendment No. 15, which is of greater substance, first, I wish to ensure that
“Any instructions given in accordance with subsection (5)(a) must be recorded in the offender’s probation records.”
Secondly, a copy of the instructions should
“be provided to the offender on request.”
I am not trying to over-bureacratise the system and add more paperwork to it, hence my suggestion that a copy of the instructions should only be given to the offender if he asks for it. If we are to have end-to-end management of offenders, which was the philosophy behind the setting up of the National Offender Management Service and which was touched upon during our discussions on the Offender Management Act 2007, it is important that we have an audit trail. In that way, a supervisor—whether from within the national probation service or from one of the commercial or third sector organisations that will be involved following the passing of the 2007 Act—should be able to see the records and say, “This is what he has been asked to do; this is what he has not done.” We need an audit trail of breaches and so forth—a trail of instructions and of the offender’s behaviour.
Too often, as we know from the current state of the prison estate, records do not follow prisoners, and there is a tremendous amount of churning of prisoners from one prison to another. Those on remand in prison can be taken to court in the morning, with no guarantee of being returned to the same prison. Nor is there any guarantee that the records attached to that person will follow—and if they do follow they are frequently late, which means that medical and other forms of rehabilitation are that much more difficult to achieve. That results in a waste of money, because the people looking after the prisoners have to start all over again. 
That is the broad point that I want to ensure is catered for by amendment No. 15.

David Howarth: I shall speak briefly to amendment No. 173. It seeks to add to the requirement in subsection (5)(b), that the offender
“must notify the responsible officer of any change of address”,
the rider that it should happen
“within a reasonable period of time”.
The underlying problem has to do with the chaotic lives of many young offenders. I am sure that many hon. Members have come across such problems in their advice surgeries. Those young persons who are subject to the criminal justice system will not always have a particularly clear address—they might live with one parent for some parts of the week and the other parent for the remainder of the week, or move between hostels and other sorts of accommodation.
Our concern is that because the clause is enforceable under subsection (6) as if it were part of the order, and therefore subject to all the enforcement procedures of clause 2, it may become a sort of “gotcha” clause for a particular group of young people. Because of the way that they live their lives, it is a provision that they are almost bound to violate. For example, requirements can be imposed under antisocial behaviour orders that the defendant cannot but violate, which will trigger enforcement. I would not want the clause to have a similar characteristic for a particular group of offenders.

David Hanson: I shall deal first with amendments Nos. 7, 8 and 15. I hope to reassure the hon. and learned Member for Harborough that his desire for matters to be placed in writing is already covered by the guidance issued to the Youth Justice Board on the national standards. They already require a responsible officer to produce an agreement with the offender, in writing and signed. It will include a number of conditions, such as the criteria for acceptable or unacceptable absence, the right to be treated fairly and with respect, and the requirement to behave acceptably and to have adequate and proper timekeeping. The Youth Justice Board national standards cover the point raised by the right hon. and learned Gentleman, and I hope that he will withdraw the amendment.
As for notification by an offender of a change of address, the priority must be the immediacy of the notification. In my view, it is essential that the responsible officer knows as soon possible of any change of address. That is best done by telephone or text message. Placing a requirement to notify the change of address in writing would also potentially be difficult for young people who have literacy problems.
The hon. and learned Gentleman also tabled an amendment that would require instructions to be recorded in offenders’ records and would require those records to be disclosed upon request. Youth offending teams and other responsible authorities already routinely keep records pertaining to young people, not least because they need to be produced by the court. If the hon. and learned Gentleman wishes that young people should be able to see their records, that could be dealt with quite properly under current data protection procedures and does not need to be reiterated in the Bill.
The hon. Member for Cambridge spoke to amendment No. 173, which is a reasonable amendment. Although I wholly endorse the sentiments expressed in the amendment, if the hon. Gentleman refers to subsection (5)(b) he will see that there is a requirement for the responsible officer to be notified of any change of address by the young person. As he mentioned, if such notification were not provided, that would be a prima facie case for a breach of order. I wish to see speedy notification of changes of address, but if we set out a time scale in the Bill it may lead to the consequences that the hon. Gentleman has mentioned. I would like to allow the responsible officer to have discretion. They will have to set out for the young person the obligations contained in the clause and make it clear that notification of any change of address is a key part of the order that could lead to a breach. Any instruction given must be carried out as quickly as is practicable by the young person, but I am not persuaded that putting a time scale in the Bill will assist the process.

David Howarth: I am glad that the Minister understands the underlying problem. There needs to be some indication, by using a word such as “reasonable” or “practicable”, which were used by the Minister, that the notification requirement should not be enforced in a rigid way. That indication does not have to be in the Bill, but it could be; I presume that there will be some guidance for that enforcement at some point and perhaps it should go in there. However, either through the Minister’s remarks today or through a change to the Bill, the Government’s precise intention should be made clear. I take the hon. Gentleman’s point about strict timetables.

David Hanson: As ever, I am happy to reflect on these matters. However, the Bill has been framed to make it clear to the responsible officer—and I hope, through the responsible officer talking to the offender—that the offender has a clear duty to provide notification of a change of address. Obviously, it is a duty that, if delayed for several weeks or months, would be a clear breach of the order and would require action to be taken, which would create difficulties for the offender. Putting a time scale in the Bill might militate against the flexibility that the hon. Gentleman wishes to see. At the same time, the Bill must put a duty on the offender and the responsible officer to take account of the need to have an up-to-date address for the offender.

David Howarth: The Minister and I do not disagree about this very much, but surely the real point is that if the responsible officer’s lack of knowledge of the address interferes with the requirements of the order, there ought to be enforcement. Enforcement should be concerned with the purpose of knowing the address, not just the mere technical fact of a change of address. If it were written into guidance that officers should bear in mind the purpose of the provision, rather than just the technicalities of it, that would deal with the point.

David Hanson: The hon. Gentleman and I are more or less in agreement that it is important that the responsible officer knows where the offender lives and has a record of that, and is informed straight away if there are any changes to that address. The hon. Gentleman suggested that we insert a time scale. We note that issue as a potential breach, but we have that common-sense discretion whereby if a long period of time were involved, the judgment could be made accordingly.

Sally Keeble: May I urge caution the other way? I am thinking of a pregnant girl of only 15 who moved house at extremely short notice and nobody knew about it, including her midwife. There is a real need to ensure that young people understand that they must tell people where they are living.

David Hanson: I accept that. The Committee is as one on the need to have up-to-date addresses because communication is important; the responsible officer needs to know where the offender is. That is a clear duty; there will be a breach of the order under subsection (5)(b) in the event of a change of address not being notified. There should be discretion to ensure that the circumstances are managed, and to decide within the guidance, and with knowledge of the offender, whether a breach has occurred. That is important because I can think of circumstances in my constituency in which individuals have had to move at short notice because of domestic violence, drug abuse at home or other circumstances that are sometimes beyond their control.
Under the Bill, the offender is obliged to notify the responsible officer of any change of address and, self-evidently, that means within a reasonable time. The amount of time can be judged by the responsible officer based on circumstances, as my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North indicated, or on guidance and advice given at the time.
In the light of those helpful comments, I hope that the hon. and learned Member for Harborough will withdraw the amendment, useful though it has been to have the exchange, and that other hon. Members will not press their amendments to a vote.

Edward Garnier: I heard what the Minister had to say and I listened with interest to the hon. Member for Cambridge. I will not ask the Committee to express an opinion about my argument, or even the Minister’s; at present, it is sufficient for me to have placed my concerns before the Committee and for the Minister to have considered them. Perhaps he will also consider them on another occasion. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Abolition of certain youth orders and related amendments

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

David Burrowes: I have a few brief but, I hope, appropriate comments. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough has already made a plea about the implementation dates. The youth court is perhaps a victim of the criminal justice system in being subject to a sentencing regime that covers the span of many pieces of legislation and implementation dates that are dealt with in a less than logical fashion.
That allows me to refer again to the reading material from the Prison Reform Trust recommended earlier, in which the sentencers said that they were all grappling with the new legislation. They referred to the new provisions, not necessarily in temperate language, as “idiotic” and the introduction of so many complex changes as “lunatic”. They made particular reference to the piecemeal introduction of the new provisions. The plea with regard to the clause, when the logic is obviously to abolish certain youth orders and related amendments, is that the implementation of the new regime in relation to youth rehabilitation orders and associated matters should be done in a logical and comprehensive fashion. That should be made clear at a very early stage to all practitioners to ensure that, at the point of delivery, the youth court is not trying to work out what is, or is not, implemented and can deliver justice in a consistent manner.

David Hanson: As the Committee will recognise, clause 6 will abolish the five existing community sentences for young offenders and replace them with a generic youth rehabilitation order, which we have spent some time discussing in Committee. The question of implementation is important and I am grateful to the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate for raising that today. Obviously, the Bill needs to pass through both Houses of Parliaments before it will receive Royal Assent. It is likely that that process will be completed by early to mid-2008 at the earliest. My perspective is that the sooner that that is done, the better, but obviously it will take some time. Given that, I do not expect that we will implement the legislation until 2009 at the earliest.

Edward Garnier: Which measures will be implemented?

David Hanson: The order—I refer to clause 6, and the abolition of youth orders and their replacement by youth rehabilitation orders. We will need to look at the important issues of delivery and training, which I will examine during the course of the Bill and will consider when the legislation has passed both Houses of Parliament.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 4

Youth rehabilitation orders: consequential and related amendments

David Hanson: I beg to move amendment No. 36, in schedule 4, page 131, line 22, at end insert—

‘Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (c. 49)
10A The Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 has effect subject to the following amendments.
10B In section 86(3) (adjustments between authority providing accommodation etc, and authority of area of residence) after “supervision order” insert “, youth rehabilitation order”.
10C In section 94(1) (interpretation)—
(a) for the definition of “probation order” substitute—
““probation order”, in relation to an order imposed by a court in Northern Ireland, has the same meaning as in the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996,”,
(b) in the definition of “supervision order”, omit “the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 or”, and
(c) at the end insert—
““youth rehabilitation order” means an order made under section 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007.”’.

Nicholas Winterton: With this it will be convenient to take the following: Government amendments Nos. 37 to 46, 54 to 56 and 58 to 73
New clause 16—Accommodation in which persons aged under 18 may be detained—
‘(1) No person aged under 18 shall be detained in a young offender institution or a secure training centre unless the Secretary of State certifies that he can be detained safely.
(2) In section 107(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing Act) 2000 (meaning of “youth detention accommodation”)—
(a) omit paragraphs (a) and (b); and
(b) in paragraph (c) after “by order specify” insert “but not including a secure training centre or young offender institution”.
(3) At the end of section 92(1)(b) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (detention under sections 90 and 91: place of detention etc.) substitute the full stop for a comma.
(4) At the end of section 92(1) insert “provided that such place is not a secure training centre or young offender institution”.
(5) Omit sections 23(7A) and (7B) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969.
(6) Omit section 98 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.’.

David Hanson: The Government amendments in this group are minor, technical and consequential amendments that repeal legislative references that will be out of date due to the new youth rehabilitation orders. I hope that they will be acceptable to the Committee.
Government amendments Nos. 55, 56 and 73 concern the manner in which the Secretary of State makes arrangements for detention of young offenders sentenced under sections 90 or 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. They are technical amendments relating to the youth rehabilitation orders and I commend them to the Committee. I will be happy to comment in due course on new clause 16 if it is spoken to by the hon. and learned Member for Harborough.

Nicholas Winterton: New clause 16 is in the name of the hon. and learned Member for Harborough, but it would be appropriate first to debate the Government amendments and then for the hon. and learned Member to make considerable reference to new clause 16.

Edward Garnier: I do not know whether my contribution will be considerable, but I hope that it will be a considered reference to new clause 16. I do not have a quarrel with the Government amendments; they are, as the Minister has said, necessary and partly consequential on clause 6 and, I suspect, the other changes to the way that youth offenders are dealt with in the criminal justice system. Some of the later Government amendments touch, although not directly, on what I want to say about new clause 16. Essentially, I want the Government to have a proper understanding of the need to put the right people in the right places.
I have been to Glen Parva young offenders institution, which is partly in my constituency and partly in that of my hon. Friend the Member for Blaby (Mr. Robathan). I have been to the YOI at Warren Hill and Hollesley Bay, which is near Woodbridge in Suffolk. I have been to Feltham YOI and Lancaster Farm YOI, which is in the north-west. All of those are institutions for young men. I also went to Bullwood Hall about a year ago, when it was being used as a YOI for young women.
Bullwood Hall has been re-roled at least twice since then and hit the news last week, no doubt to the Minister’s enjoyment. It was associated with HMP Canterbury because those two institutions are now used exclusively to accommodate foreign national prisoners. I will not talk about that, but I will talk about my experience of young offenders institutions. Based on that, I urge the Minister to ensure that we send the right people to the right sort of custodial institution, as I said at the outset of my remarks.
Compared with the adult prisoner estate, young offender institutions are very troubled and troubling places. That is not just because they are full of young people who are there because they have committed serious crimes—some of them very serious indeed. There is a unit within Warren Hill and Hollesley Bay where youngsters who have committed murder—some of them quite nasty murders—are held, and will be held for long periods. At Feltham, about 20 young men are serving the equivalent of life sentences, and there are other young men who have committed serious crimes in the other YOIs to which I have referred.
We are dealing with a difficult collection of people and nothing that I am about to say should be taken as a criticism of the governors, the governing staff or the prison officers who work in these difficult institutions. We need to be very careful that we do not put into institutions that are for over-18s younger teenagers of the age group that is to be brought within the youth rehabilitation order and youth custody remit. We need to be extremely careful in ensuring that there is sufficient capacity to house those under the age of 18 securely and safely in secure sites. If we get that wrong, those youngsters could be badly damaged. We could face the sort of circumstances that the hon. Member for Northampton, North spoke about in her Adjournment debate over the death of a young constituent of hers in a secure unit outside her constituency. It was a story that caused a great deal of alarm. The Minister responded to that Adjournment debate and I was on the Opposition Front Bench as he did so.
There are a whole host of issues—easy, not so easy and plain difficult—that we have to be aware of when talking about the incarceration of young people. I want the Minister’s assurance that the Ministry of Justice has the resources and the personnel to deal with the imprisonment of youngsters, has trained those personnel and has fully understood the difficult nature of the task. A number of people who have spoken about the imprisonment of young people say that we should not be sending children or young people to prison. I am not sure that I would go that far because there will be some young teenagers who commit crimes that society would expect to result in custody. However, custody, whether of young people or adults, must be humane and carried out in a way that improves the chances of their being able to return to society in a better state.

Harry Cohen: What is the hon. and learned Gentleman’s view of young people who have been incarcerated in an adult prison, even if they have committed an horrendous offence?

Edward Garnier: I do not like it. The problem that we face, which is one of the Government’s own making, is that the custodial estate is full to the gunnels. I might be wrong, but I do not think that young offenders are kept in police cells or court cells overnight. There is no more room on the custodial estate. It has more than its official capacity. Last Friday, there were 81,533 adult prisoners. That is about 30 prisoners over the establishment. It might be thought that 30 is not a big number, but the Committee must bear in mind that about 20,000 adult prisoners are in cells that were designed for one person and which are now having to be shared by two or three people.
We have an accommodation problem. To deal with it, people are being put into cells or accommodation with others of a different age group. I accept fully that some people look 14, but are 20 years old, while some look 20, but are 14 years old. We must be careful that people are put in the right place.
Because of overcrowding, young offenders convicted of offences or on remand in custody in courts in the east of England, for example, are having to be taken in a sweat box hundreds of miles overnight and brought back to court the following day. On some occasions, they do not arrive at their overnight accommodation until well after 9 o’clock. When I was at Lancaster Farms, the governor and his senior colleagues said, with huge regret, that there was not much that they could do about the fact that young people were arriving in their care at almost midnight. That has an effect on the child or young person as well as on the staff who, by the time that they have gone over their shift and are waiting to go home, are not necessarily in the best frame of mind to deal with disoriented, difficult or plainly bad teenagers in need of overnight accommodation.

Sally Keeble: Given that the hon. and learned Gentleman referred to very disturbed young people who have committed murder, he and my right hon. Friend the Minister might like to visit Northampton and see the model of care that is provided by St. Andrew’s for such people. It is different from the Home Office estate. The way in which it deals with those young people is stunning.

Edward Garnier: I should be interested to visit St. Andrew’s. It comes under the auspices of the Department of Health, not the Ministry of Justice. When I visited Grendon Underwood, a special and marvellous institution that is run by the Ministry of Justice and the Prison Service, I asked the governor whether it was a hospital with bars or a prison with doctors. He said, “It is a prison with doctors, but I wish that it was a hospital with bars because we would get more money to do what we have to do.” I accept that we are not debating such matters this afternoon, but at some stage we, as legislators, will have to work out the best way in which to deal with disturbed people who end up in the criminal justice system. I have made my point. It is important that we not only lock up the right people for the right offences, but that we lock them up in the right place, and that people do not come to any harm once they are locked up.
Finally, on a happier note, I wish to draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that this might be the first time that Members of Parliament have tabled a new clause that would
“substitute the full stop for a comma”.
One can see it by looking at the end of subsection (3) of new clause 16. It is a matter of some considerable note.

David Howarth: If the hon. and learned Gentleman looked at the Committee that considered the Companies Bill, he would see the first instance of almost everything, even including proposed changes to punctuation.

Edward Garnier: I knew that a former law don would have his finger, as it were, on every piece of punctuation on every piece of legislation that the House has dealt with over many years, but it is a matter of some personal pride that new clause 16 would amend legislation in the way to which I referred.

Nicholas Winterton: I had spotted that particular passage.

David Heath: Punctuation can make a difference to legislation, and we would do well to take care over it.
I do not wish to add anything to what the hon. and learned Member for Harborough said—his argument was extremely cogent, and I support it. I simply wish to ask the Minister a more general question about what Government amendment No. 44 will do regarding amendments to Scots law? Will it simply replace terms, or will it have a real effect on the way in which Scots courts will deal with the matter? If it will have a real effect, should there not be an amendment to clause 127 about its extent?

David Hanson: I thank the hon. and learned Member for Harborough for raising this issue because it gives the Committee an opportunity to consider his point. Like him, I have, in the course of my duties, had the opportunity to visit a number of youth offender institutions and secure training centres in the past few months. Indeed, in my previous role, I was responsible for the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland and for secure units and youth offender institutes. I understand the challenges of managing the young people and of working with the staff of those institutions.
My most recent visit to such an institution was to the Hindley youth offenders institute near Leigh in Greater Manchester. Difficult and challenging behaviour problems need to be addressed in those centres. I am due to visit the Oakhill secure training centre in Milton Keynes with my right hon. Friend, the Minister for Children, Young People and Families to examine some of the issues arising from the way it operates and performs, and at how we can improve it.
I agree with the hon. and learned Gentleman that we must provide a safe and productive environment for young people in those establishments. I say “safe” because it is important that we protect young people not only from self harm, but from the potential harm they might suffer from other young people in the centres. We also need to create an environment in which staff are protected and secured from potential attack. We must ensure that people in the centres have a productive regime. The whole thrust of the legislation, the Bill and Government policy is to ensure that whatever mistakes people have made, we prevent them from reoffending.
There are a number of measures in place to provide broadly for the safety of people in secure units and youth offender institutions. Under the Children Act 2004, governors and directors of young offender institutions and secure training centres are already required to have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in discharging their functions.
What is certainly true—the hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned this in passing—is that these establishments contain some very dangerous young people. According to our most recent figures, which are dated 22 October, 64 young people in custody are charged with murder. Those are very dangerous individuals and that requires not just a safety regime, but a productive regime to try to turn around the offending behaviour. That comes back to the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Leyton and Wanstead. We must ensure that we have proper investment in education and skill training. Nearly every young person in that accommodation will come out into the community at some point in the future. They need a proper regime, a safe regime and one that invests in them to turn their lives around.

Sally Keeble: On the point about funding for education and hospitals, St. Andrew’s hospital, for example, does not get funding for education. There needs to be some parity. Would my right hon. Friend accept that if young people are convicted of murder and sent to a psychiatric hospital, they should have access to education in the same way as they would if they were sent to a young offenders institution or a Home Office establishment?

David Hanson: I hope and expect that they would. I will certainly look at that matter outside the Committee to ensure that that is the case.
The whole thrust of our discussion today is the prevention of reoffending. We have young people, some very young, who need education and investment, who need to have their offending behaviour addressed and who ultimately need to come out of the young offender institution as better people than when they went into it. From my visits to such institutions, both secure training centres and young offenders institutions, I know that that work is ongoing.
The statistics still show that we are facing very difficult and challenging times in working through that. There is still a high level of reoffending by those young people when they leave secure training centres and youth offending institutions. Our purpose has to be—I agree with the hon. and learned Gentleman—to ensure that we have a safe and productive environment. I am not able to accept his new clause, but I accept some of the thrust of the arguments about having that safety and that positive regime in the centres.
The hon. and learned Member for Harborough will know, as will my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North, that one of the issues we have looked at recently is restraint and its use in secure training centres and other establishments. My hon. Friend has been very assiduous in pressing the concerns of her constituents. She will know, as the Committee knows, that there have been two serious inquests following the deaths of individuals in custody. We need to reflect on those issues and take them on board.
In July, I instigated a full review across the estate of the use of restraint in the young persons’ estates. With the Minister for Children, Young People and Families, I recently appointed two joint chairs to conduct the review, which is now taking evidence. I hope that the hon. and learned Member for Harborough and the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome will submit their views to the joint review on restraint. That review will report to me by 4 April 2008. My right hon. Friend and I will be taking decisions on the use of restraint. I hope that the regime will ultimately have an effect on disturbed behaviour by young people, either through self-harm or against each other.

Sally Keeble: I was going to write to my right hon. Friend about a visit that I made to St. Andrew’s, where different methods of managing young people’s behaviour are used. The whole design of the building and the regime there have a very different impact from those of the secure training centres. Although St. Andrew’s is a health establishment, in his review will he consider the methods used in such establishments as alternatives to restraint?

David Hanson: I will reflect on that outside the Committee and will await the letter from my hon. Friend with some interest. We have published the terms of reference of the review, and we have appointed two individuals to conduct it, both of whom are strong professionals in their field. The review will report to me. They have sent invitations this week for evidence to be presented to them. In terms of the safety issue, the use of restraint in secure training centres and other establishments is being looked at in the round, because of the challenging nature of some of the individuals.
In July, I tabled amendments on restraint issues in the other place and this place, because self-harm, harm against other individuals, and harm against staff can be prevented by restraint, but we need to look at how it is used in the context also of preventing some of the tragic events that have happened in the past.

David Heath: Will the review on restraint also deal with the question of protective armaments for prison staff raised by the Prison Officers Association—the baton question?

David Hanson: That is not specifically part of the review’s terms of reference. At the prison officers’ request, we are considering a separate undertaking dealing the use of batons, but it is not part of the formal review, the terms of which were published in July. If hon. Members wish to consider that aspect of the safety issues in institutions, they should refer back to those terms of reference which were published, I think, on the last day before the summer recess.

Harry Cohen: I welcome the review announced by the Minister and I congratulate him on it; it is very important. One of the organisations with which I have worked in the past that is very active in this field is Inquest. May I recommend that he meets them as part of the review process, at a suitable time?

Nicholas Winterton: I am not sure that it is entirely relevant to the debate, but it could be.

David Hanson: The review will provide important background information to our debates on how to improve safety. My hon. Friend has mentioned Inquest. The review is, in a sense, an arm’s length Government review. With my right hon. Friend the Minister for Children, Young People and Families, I have appointed two independent chairs. They are conducting the review independent of Government. I am sure that Inquest will submit evidence to them. When I gave evidence in another place last week, Inquest were present. I have no doubt that they will follow the process with interest and play an active role in it.
Although I cannot accept his clause, I feel that the hon. and learned Member for Harborough has made some very strong points. I take seriously the safety regime in young offender institutions and secure training centres. In my view they are, for the most part, very positive. In future, I want to tackle some of the causes of offending behaviour which have brought young people into custody in the first place with a positive education and health regime.
We have taken a number of important general measures such as the separation of under-18s from over-18s, and we are developing new high-dependency units for more vulnerable boys to help support those individuals. To give the Committee some context, there are more than 300 places in secure training centres; more than 2,500 in young offender institutions; and more than 230 in secure children’s homes. They are very cost intensive: secure training centre places cost £170,000 a year; young offender institution places cost £50,000 per year; and secure children’s home places cost £190,000 per year. I want those resources to be used effectively to prevent reoffending. It will be a failure of our system if the young people who are sentenced to and attend those institutions leave them and graduate to adult prisons. I want both security and effective rehabilitation to be part of the process.
I ask the hon. and learned Gentleman to reflect on those points. I hope that I have offered him some satisfaction, and I ask him to not to press his new clause. I urge the Committee to accept the Government amendments.

David Heath: And Scotland?

David Hanson: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for reminding me about the position in Scotland. No amendments to extend the clause have been requested, as it already provides that amendments made by the Bill to existing Acts have the same extent as the Act as amended, if that makes sense. Amendment No. 44 makes no substantive change to the law, as it replaces references to the existing community order with references to the new youth rehabilitation order. I hope that that satisfies him.
 Mr. Heath indicated assent.

David Hanson: For the sake of the Committee, if the hon. and learned Member for Harborough wishes to reflect on what I said and examine it in the cold light of day, I am happy for him to do so. I hope that that satisfies him.

Edward Garnier: If it were appropriate for me within the rules of procedure of the Committee to ask your leave to withdraw the new clause, Sir Nicholas, I would do so, but it is not, so I shall not. I wish to respond briefly to the Minister.
Although we would not admit this on a party political occasion, I believe that the Minister and I have much in common in our concern about what is happening in the custodial estate. He mentioned the huge cost of young offender institutions, secure training centres and some secure children’s homes. He says that he wants to prevent failure and that failure is reoffending. Well, we are already failing. The reoffending rate for people under 21 is about 75 per cent., and some studies suggest that it is over 80 per cent. We are already failing, so that huge investment per young person that the Minister spoke about is already wasted money. We are not seeing a dividend.
Prisons, young offender institutions, secure training centres and other places where children are kept in custody are part of a secret world, about which we do not know enough. I hope that this short debate has acted as a window through which we as parliamentarians can look into the secure estate. It is unfortunate that this occasion did not provide a window through which those inside can look out to a world that is prepared to welcome them back as long as they are reformed, rehabilitated and prepared to live useful lives. It is essential that somehow or other we create those metaphorical windows so that we can get better value for money and far better outputs, to use a rather nasty word, from the criminal justice system.
At present, we are wasting money and lives, and, in some respects, destroying lives. I want all of that stopped. I want our streets and communities to be safer, and the reoffending rate to come down sufficiently. We will never get down to the ideal of zero, but the rate is far too high at present, and we seriously need to do something about it.
I would be interested to learn more about the joint review. I had not heard of it. That may be my fault, but I would be pleased if the Minister sent me details about it or let me know if it is on some Ministry of Justice website. I shall not detain the Committee further. I hope that the proposals will shunt things on a bit in a sensible way.

Amendment agreed to.

Nicholas Winterton: With the will and the permission of the Committee, I would seek to put Government amendments Nos. 37 to 48 together. They are not controversial, and therefore I hope that the Committee will be happy with that—[ Interruption. ] May I say to the Government Whip that there are other Government amendments that have been discussed—or not, as they case may be—as part of the group that we have just debated? They will be taken in due course, and I will ask the Minister to move them formally when we come to them.

Amendments made: No. 37, in schedule 4, page 131, line 25, at end insert—
‘11A Section 25 (transfers between England or Wales and Northern Ireland) ceases to have effect.
11B (1) Section 26 (transfers between England or Wales and the Channel Islands or Isle of Man) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)(c), for the words from “supervision order” to “2000” substitute “youth rehabilitation order imposing a local authority residence requirement”.
(3) In subsection (2), for the words from “supervision order” to “2000” substitute “youth rehabilitation order imposing a local authority residence requirement”.’.
No. 38, in schedule 4, page 131, line 31, leave out paragraphs (b) and (c) and insert—
‘(b) for paragraph (b) substitute—
“(b) from local authority accommodation—
(i) in which he is required to live by virtue of a youth rehabilitation order imposing a local authority residence requirement (within the meaning of Part 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007); or
(ii) to which he has been remanded under paragraph 21 of Schedule 2 to the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007; or
(iii) to which he has been remanded or committed under section 23(1) of this Act,”.’.
No. 39, in schedule 4, page 132, line 19, leave out from ‘for’ to end of line 20 and insert
‘the words from “mentioned in subsection” to “this section is in premises” substitute “mentioned in subsection (1), (1A)(a) or (b)(i) or (ii) or (1D) of this section is in premises”.’.
No. 40, in schedule 4, page 132, line 27, leave out ‘and’ and insert—
‘(aa) after the definition of “local authority accommodation” insert—
““local authority residence requirement” has the same meaning as in Part 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007;”, and’.
No. 41, in schedule 4, page 132, line 32, at end insert—
‘13A In section 73(4)(a) (provisions of section 32 extending to Scotland) for “to (1C)” substitute “to (1E)”.’.
No. 42, in schedule 4, page 132, line 40, leave out paragraph 16 and insert—
‘16 In section 7(2) (limitations on rehabilitation under Act, etc.) for paragraph (d) substitute—
“(d) in any proceedings relating to the variation or discharge of a youth rehabilitation order under Part 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007, or on appeal from any such proceedings;”.’.
No. 43, in schedule 4, page 137, line 14, at end insert—
‘31A In paragraph 3 of Schedule 8 (privately fostered children) for paragraph (a) substitute—
“(a) a youth rehabilitation order made under section 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007;”.’.
No. 44, in schedule 4, page 139, line 2, at end insert—

‘Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (c. 46)
35A The Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 has effect subject to the following amendments.
35B (1) Section 234 (probation orders: persons residing in England and Wales) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (2), at the end insert “(in any case where the offender has attained the age of 18 years) or under section 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007 (in any other case)”.
(3) In subsection (4)—
(a) in paragraph (a), for “and section 207(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003” substitute “, section 207(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and paragraph 20(2) of Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007”,
(b) in paragraph (a), for “or, as the case may be, community orders under Part 12 of that Act” substitute “, community orders under Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 or, as the case may be, youth rehabilitation orders under Part 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007”,
(c) in paragraph (a), for “and section 207 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003” substitute “, section 207 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and paragraph 20 of Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007”,
(d) in paragraph (b), after “2003” insert “or (as the case may be) paragraphs 20(4) and 21(1) to (3) of Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007”, and
(e) in paragraph (b), at the end insert “or that paragraph”.
(4) In subsection (4A) at the end insert “(in any case where the offender has attained the age of 18 years) or in a youth rehabilitation order made under section 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007 (in any other case)”.
(5) In subsection (5) for the words from “subject to subsection (6)” to the end substitute “subject to subsections (6) and (6A) below—
(a) Schedule 8 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 shall apply as if it were a community order made by a magistrates’ court under section 177 of that Act and imposing the requirements specified under subsection (4A) above (in any case where the offender has attained the age of 18 years); and
(b) Schedule 2 to the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007 shall apply as if it were a youth rehabilitation order made by a magistrates’ court under section 1 of that Act and imposing the requirements specified under that subsection (in any other case).”
(6) After subsection (6) insert—
“(6A) In its application to a probation order made or amended under this section, Schedule 2 to the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007 has effect subject to the following modifications—
(a) any reference to the responsible officer has effect as a reference to the person appointed or assigned under subsection (1)(a) above,
(b) in paragraph 6, sub-paragraph (2)(c) is omitted and, in sub-paragraph (16), the reference to the Crown Court has effect as a reference to a court in Scotland, and
(c) Parts 3 and 5 are omitted.”
35C (1) Section 242 (community service orders: persons residing in England and Wales) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)(a)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (ii), after “Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003)” insert “, in any case where the offender has attained the age of 18 years, or an unpaid work requirement imposed by a youth rehabilitation order (within the meaning of Part 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007), in any other case”, and
(b) in sub-paragraph (iii), after “section 177 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003” insert “or, as the case may be, imposed by youth rehabilitation orders made under section 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007”.
(3) In subsection (2)(b)—
(a) after “that court” insert “, in any case where the offender has attained the age of 18 years,” and
(b) after “2003” insert “or it appears to that court, in any other case, that provision can be made for the offender to perform work under the order under the arrangements which exist in that area for persons to perform work under unpaid work requirements imposed by youth rehabilitation orders made under section 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007”.
(4) In subsection (3)(b) at the end insert “or, as the case may be, conferred on responsible officers by Part 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007 in respect of unpaid work requirements imposed by youth rehabilitation orders (within the meaning of that Part)”.
35D (1) Section 244 (community service orders: general provisions relating to persons residing in England and Wales or Northern Ireland) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (3)(a)—
(a) after “2003)” insert “or, as the case may be, a youth rehabilitation order (within the meaning of Part 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007)”, and
(b) after “such community orders” insert “or youth rehabilitation orders”.
(3) In subsection (4)(a)—
(a) for “or, as the case may be, community orders” substitute “, community orders”, and
(b) after “2003)” insert “or, as the case may be, youth rehabilitation orders (within the meaning of Part 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007)”.
(4) In subsection (5)—
(a) for “or, as the case may be, a community order” substitute “, a community order”, and
(b) after “2003)” insert “or, as the case may be, a youth rehabilitation order (within the meaning of Part 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007)”.
(5) In subsection (6)—
(a) for “or, as the case may be, community orders” substitute “, community orders”,
(b) after “within the meaning of Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003)” insert “or, as the case may be, youth rehabilitation orders (within the meaning of Part 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007)”, and
(c) after “the responsible officer under Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003” insert “or, as the case may be, under Part 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007”.’.
No. 45, in schedule 4, page 141, line 30, at end insert—

‘Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000 (c. 19)
53A The Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000 has effect subject to the following amendments.
53B (1) Section 62 (loss of benefit for breach of community order) is amended as follows.
(2) In the definition of “relevant community order” in subsection (8)—
(a) after “2003;” in paragraph (a) insert—
“(aa) a youth rehabilitation order made under section 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007;”, and
(b) in paragraph (b) for “such an order” substitute “an order specified in paragraph (a) or (aa)”.
(3) In subsection (11)(c)(ii) for “and (b)” substitute “to (b)”.
53C (1) Section 64 (information provision) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (6)(a) after “2003)” insert “, youth rehabilitation orders (as defined by section 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007)”.
(3) In subsection (7) after paragraph (b) insert—
“(ba) a responsible officer within the meaning of Part 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007;”.’.
No. 46, in schedule 4, page 145, line 39, leave out ‘in paragraph (b)(ii),’ and insert
‘in paragraph (b) (as substituted by paragraph 12(2)(b) of this Schedule), in sub-paragraph (ii),’.
No. 47, in schedule 4, page 147, line 28, at end insert—
(7A) If a local authority has parental responsibility for an offender who is in its care or provided with accommodation by it in the exercise of any social services functions, the reference in sub-paragraph (7)(b) to a parent or guardian of the offender is to be read as a reference to that authority.
(7B) In sub-paragraph (7A)—
“local authority” has the same meaning as it has in Part 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007 by virtue of section 7 of that Act,
“parental responsibility” has the same meaning as it has in the Children Act 1989 by virtue of section 3 of that Act, and
“social services functions” has the same meaning as it has in the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970 by virtue of section 1A of that Act.’.
No. 48, in schedule 4, page 149, line 4, at end insert—
(5A) If a local authority has parental responsibility for an offender who is in its care or provided with accommodation by it in the exercise of any social services functions, the reference in sub-paragraph (5)(b) to a parent or guardian of the offender is to be read as a reference to that authority.
(5B) In sub-paragraph (5A)—
“local authority” has the same meaning as it has in Part 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2007 by virtue of section 7 of that Act,
“parental responsibility” has the same meaning as it has in the Children Act 1989 by virtue of section 3 of that Act, and
“social services functions” has the same meaning as it has in the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970 by virtue of section 1A of that Act.’.—[Mr. Hanson.]

Schedule 4, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 7

Youth rehabilitation orders: interpretation

Amendment made: No. 19, in clause 7, page 6, line 17, at end add—
‘(4) If a local authority has parental responsibility for an offender who is in its care or provided with accommodation by it in the exercise of any social services functions, any reference in this Part (except in paragraphs 4 and 24 of Schedule 1) to the offender’s parent or guardian is to be read as a reference to that authority.
(5) In subsection (4)—
“parental responsibility” has the same meaning as it has in the Children Act 1989 (c. 41) by virtue of section 3 of that Act, and
“social services functions” has the same meaning as it has in the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970 (c. 42) by virtue of section 1A of that Act.’.—[Mr. Hanson.]

Clause 7, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8

Isles of Scilly

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

David Heath: I shall be brief. Years of experience have led me to form the view that, if I wish to disconcert Ministers in charge of criminal justice Bills, I should ask them either about courts martial, Northern Ireland or British overseas territories. Northern Ireland simply will not work in this respect, because two of the Ministers know far more about it than I do, and courts martial have been covered, but I have never before considered the possibilities of asking about the Isles of Scilly, which form part of the English and Welsh jurisdiction.
I assume that the rest of the Bill applies, unamended, to the Isles of Scilly and that the clause refers only to part 1. However, I am keen to ensure that the orders, which it appears now can be evaded by going to Thurso, cannot also be evaded by going to Tresco, because that may be a temptation to young hooligans in Penzance and Newlyn, for whom that would not be a huge journey. Can I just be assured that the principal objectives of the rehabilitation orders will take effect in the Isles of Scilly and that the Minister’s intention in including a power to exempt by order is not to remove any significant part of the orders that we have debated?

David Hanson: As ever, I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I hope that, as he said, I cannot be caught out by him on Northern Ireland. Having had two years there as Minister of State, I feel as though I can answer any questions relating to Northern Ireland. In relation to our discussion earlier about Scotland, I have already indicated that I will write to him to clarify that point and, although I feel that it is covered, I will reflect on what he said.
I know little about the Isles of Scilly except that the former Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, used to holiday there. [Interruption.] And apparently he is buried there. Apart from that, I cannot string a sentence together on the Isles of Scilly. However, I can tell the hon. Gentleman that the youth rehabilitation order will have effect in the Isles of Scilly, with such exceptions and adaptations as the Secretary of State may specify. Unlike areas of England and Wales, the Isles of Scilly are not a county or a district council, so the Secretary of State may need to make some adaptations by order in order to reflect the curious nature of the jurisdiction of the Isles of Scilly. It will not alter the fact that the youth rehabilitation order will have effect in the Isles of Scilly and will, I hope, prevent reoffending by whatever Isles of Scilly residents are called these days.

David Heath: Nor is the common council of the City of London, and there was no problem in inserting that into clause 7’s definition of a local authority. That is normally what is done with the Isles of Scilly, and I wondered why we need a separate order. I need not extend the debate further though.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9

Purposes etc. of sentencing: offenders aged under 18

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 135, in clause 9, page 6, line 25, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
‘(1) After section 142 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44) insert—
“142A Purposes etc. of sentencing: offenders aged under 18
(1) This section applies where a court is dealing with an offender aged under 18 in respect of an offence.
(2) The court must have regard primarily to the welfare and well-being of the offender, in accordance with its duties under section 44 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933.
(3) The court must ensure a proportionate response to offending behaviour.
(4) The court must also—
(a) have regard to the purposes of sentencing mentioned in subsection (5), in so far as it is not required to do so by subsection (2), and
(b) in accordance with section 37 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, have regard to the principal aim of the youth justice system, namely to prevent offending (including re-offending) by children and young persons.
(5) The purposes of sentencing are—
(a) the reform and rehabilitation of offenders,
(b) the protection of the public, and
(c) the making of reparation by offenders to persons affected by their offences.
(6) This section does not apply—
(a) to an offence the sentence for which is fixed by law,
(b) in relation to the making of a hospital order (with or without a restriction order), an interim hospital order, a hospital direction or a limitation direction under Part 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
(7) In respect of a proportionate response, as stated in subsection (3), this shall be considered to mean a variety of dispositions, such as care, guidance and supervision orders; counselling; probation; foster care; education and vocational training programmes and other alternatives to institutional care, in a manner proportionate both to their circumstances and the offence.’.

Nicholas Winterton: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment No. 193, in clause 9, page 6, line 26, leave out ‘18’ and insert ‘19’.
Amendment No. 194, in clause 9, page 6, line 28, leave out ‘18’ and insert ‘19’.
Amendment No. 195, in clause 9, page 6, line 31, leave out ‘18’ and insert ‘19’.
Amendment No. 9, in clause 9, page 7, line 1, after ‘of’, insert ‘financial compensation or other appropriate’.
Amendment No. 196, in clause 9, page 7, line 18, leave out ‘18’ and insert ‘19’.
Amendment No. 136, in clause 9, page 7, line 20, leave out subsections (3) and (4).
Amendment No. 197, in clause 9, page 7, line 25, leave out ‘18’ and insert ‘19’.
Amendment No. 198, in clause 9, page 7, line 34, leave out ‘18’ and insert ‘19’.
Clause stand part.
New clause 13—Principal aim of the youth justice system—
‘(1) Section 37 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c.37) (aim of the youth justice system) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), after “preventing offending” insert “(including re-offending)”.
(3) At end insert—
“(3) Subsection (2) above is subject to section 142A(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (which requires a court to have a regard primarily to the welfare and well-being of offenders aged under 18 in accordance with its duties under section 44 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933).”.’.
New clause 14—Courts to have regard to the welfare and well-being of offenders under 18—
‘(1) Section 44 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (principles to be observed by all courts in dealing with children and young persons: general considerations) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1) after “shall have regard to the welfare”, insert “and well-being”.
(3) After subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) In complying with their duties under subsection (1), courts shall have regard in particular to the following matters—
(a) in respect of welfare, the matters set out in section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989; and
(b) in respect of well-being, the matters set out in section 10(2) of the Children Act 2004.”’.

David Heath: It is rather rare that one is almost formally invited by the Attorney-General to table an amendment in Committee, but in this instance we can properly say that we were. Similar amendments with the same objective as those in this group were proposed on 3 July in the House of Lords to clause 33 of the Bill that became the Offender Management Act 2007 by my noble friends Lord Wallace of Saltaire and Baroness Linklater. They were well supported, and received support from Baroness Anelay of St. Johns, Lord Ramsbotham, Lord Judd and Baroness Howe of Idlicote. In response, the Attorney-General, Baroness Scotland, said:
“The distinction between welfare and well-being is an interesting, important and rather subtle one. The House will have extensive opportunities to reflect on it during consideration of Clause 9 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, referred, which was recently introduced in another place. I agree with her that that is probably the better place for these issues to be more fully debated.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 3 July 2007; Vol. 693, c. 999.]
That is very much an invitation from a Minister to table these amendments, which is something that I have not enjoyed before. The Minister may care to have words with the Attorney-General later.
The amendments relate to sentencing, which is a serious purpose to which we could devote a considerable amount of time. I do not propose to do so, because we can simply state the objectives of this group of amendments. Essentially, they would introduce into the principles of sentencing in the criminal court some of the underlying principles that apply in the family court in terms of the welfare of the child and its paramountcy.
As the Minister will know, the Children Act 1989 requires that the principle should apply to all children involved in family court proceedings, and that there is a welfare checklist that the court is required to consider when taking forward any proceedings involving a child. The proposition before us this afternoon is that a similar welfare checklist ought to apply when dealing with the rehabilitation orders, which have at their core the idea that one treats the individual as a whole. The circumstances that might promote criminality and offending behaviour in that child, and all those influences that are pooled together by those agencies that have dealings with the young offender and that are invited to give their views and advice to the court, ought to be taken into account during the sentencing procedure.
The Children Act 2004 framework document—the five outcomes document— examines the factors that ought to be taken into account when considering whether a relevant authority or institution has improved a child’s well-being. Some of those factors are entirely relevant to the actions of a court when considering the disposals available to it in dealing with a young offender. There are particular factors that are relevant to the points made earlier by the hon. Members for Northampton, North and for Leyton and Wanstead and by the hon. and learned Member for Harborough.
What are the provisions available, in the context of sentencing procedure, to deal with education, for instance? Is there a special needs requirement that is not currently being met? What are the welfare implications? Is the child a child in need, as identified under section 17 of the Children Act 1989? Those are material issues, as are mental health assessment, consideration of housing and living conditions, and consideration of physical health. All these factors, if they are taken in the round, provide the substance that ought to underlay the principles of sentencing.
What is being proposed is to draw together the various strands of Government policy in this area. The Government have been very clear in stating their intentions in respect of how best to deal with children who suffer various disadvantages and to ensure that they have access to the type of support that they need. All those factors are relevant to a person who has found themselves in trouble with the courts, where there are underlying issues that go beyond the offending behaviour, which must properly be brought into account when considering the measures contained in the Bill. By extending the principles of sentencing to encompass those factors, I believe that the courts would take an even wider view than they currently do of their responsibilities to the child as well as to society, in trying to protect society against the offending behaviour, in dealing properly with the prospects of recidivism and in ensuring that there is less prospect of reoffending.
Without extending the debate—I think that my intentions are very clear already, and I have no doubt that other Members will support my views—I believe that the amendments would reconcile the provisions of this Bill with the Children Act 2004 and other legislation. They would reconcile the systems that are already in place in the family court to those in the criminal court, which would produce more integration in what we do with these young people to ensure that they have access to the support that they need.

Harry Cohen: In this cluster of amendments—Nos. 193 to 198—are amendments that I tabled, which would all do the same thing, which is alter the age below which the youth justice system is involved from 18 to 19. That arises very much from the evidence that we were given in our fourth sitting by Les Lawrence of the Local Government Association. He said:
“My final point—and it is a strange conundrum—is that the Children Act 2004 created the concept of a child or young person as being from 0 to 19. In the youth justice system, the cut off is at 18.”
He goes on to say that
“as far as the responsibility of a local authority under the Children Act goes, that person should be supported until the age of 19.”——[Official Report, Criminal Justice and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 18 October 2007; c. 144, Q290.]
Mr. Lawrence was referring to the gap of a year. My amendment aims to put some coherence into the system. I would not mind if the local authorities were to start at 18, but it is probably better that the youth justice system includes those aged 18 and finishes at 19, so that there is not that gap. I have tabled these probing amendments to get the Minister’s opinion on that and to hear what he thinks about the gap that was identified by Mr. Lawrence.
While we are talking about ages, I will take the opportunity to discuss a matter that is not specifically about 18 to 19-year-olds, but still relevant. On Second Reading, I quoted from the newsletter from the youth offending teams’ managers at their annual general meeting. It states:
“It is crucial that there is a distinct and separate youth criminal justice system, where 17-year olds are afforded the same rights as 16-year olds on arrest and within the court system. This would mean access to an appropriate adult at the police station as well as the remand criteria equating to that of 16-year olds.”
They go on to say that the review of Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and this Bill are opportunities to forward that ambition. Clearly, there is a gap from 16 to 17-year-olds that needs to be addressed as well. At least the local authorities and the youth justice system recognise that the matter in respect of 17 and 18-year-olds needs to be addressed. My amendment aims to get some coherence into the system and address that gap.
I will say a few words about the amendment and the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome. I will not make a big speech now, but in the initial stages, I said that I felt that the welfare and development of the child have to have a more paramount position in the criminal justice system. I hold that as my view and that is very much what his amendments are about. I like the look of his amendments in lots of ways and will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say.
While I accept that there needs to be some blurring in legislation, we also need some clarity. We should be clear in our own mind of the three elements that we want in the system. First, we need punishment and retribution, but the truth is that the UN conventions on the rights of the child and others and Government legislation do not talk about punishment and retribution. They may be a factor in the criminal justice system, and if they are, we need to be honest and say that they are necessary for horrendous crimes, but we need to set out their limitations. The system should not be solely about punishment and retribution. That is why I think that we need some clarity, including in the legislation.
The other element is the welfare and well-being of the child, and that is in all the documents that we have signed up to, including the convention on the rights of the child. The reason that we have come so far down that chart on looking after children has a lot to do with how we treat child offenders. We have not given that element the priority that it should have had. We must revisit that point and be clear that whatever happens on the other factors, the welfare and well-being of the child will always be present in how we expect children to be dealt with. That point is very important.
Thirdly, my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth, a former Home Office Minister, made the point on Tuesday that, since it has been in power, Labour has seen the prevention of reoffending as a priority. That is the other factor that is involved in this issue. Often, those elements can work together. For instance, the welfare of the child, in terms of education and the development of skills for when they come out of custody, can work towards the prevention of reoffending.
We need to be clear in our minds about the three factors: punishment, preventing reoffending, and welfare and well-being. We must be clear about what priority we give them, how we spell that out in the legislation and how we expect it to be implemented. I come back to the point that the amendments are about the welfare and well-being of the child. That must always be present in conjunction with the other two factors. We must say to administrators and judges that the welfare and well-being of the child is an important factor, which we expect them to take account of.

Sally Keeble: I am pleased to take part in this debate because it gets to the heart of what the youth criminal justice system is all about. Personally, I oppose the amendment, although I have enormous sympathy will all the sentiments that gave rise to it. I agree completely with the approach of many of the outside organisations that have promoted this measure, but I do not agree with the amendment. I thought that it might be helpful to set out why that is.
The state obviously has to think about a number of issues. One is the protection of the wider public, which is what the criminal justice system is all about, to a great extent. There are also issues about the welfare of the child, which is also the state’s responsibility. That is the responsibility of different Departments under different bits of legislation; for instance, the Department for Children, Schools and Families is involved. The amendments confuse or give the wrong priority to some of the roles and responsibilities. However much we do not like what has happened to these children in their lives and however much we might sympathise, once they are in front of the court, being sentenced, they have stepped over the boundary.
The job of the courts must be to deal with the crime, as well as to deal with the young offender. The sequencing for that in the legislation seems to be the right way round. When the courts come to sentencing, they have to deal with the offending behaviour, and in the process of dealing with that, must look at the welfare of the child.
We have discussed the enormous sympathy with which the young people must be treated in different instances, for example, with regard to the religious views of the family. Those things are absolutely right. However, once the child is in the criminal justice system, it is right that the offending behaviour has to be the first concern. Part of this issue is about sequencing. In other areas of our legislation, courts and others have to sequence different roles and responsibilities of the state in making their decisions. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome mentioned the family courts, but they are different. I am not involved in the legal profession, but I understand that, in many instances, in the family courts, the welfare of the child is protected against the war that goes on between the parents. It is absolutely right to say that the paramount concern in all this must be the welfare of the child, not the right to access of either parent.
I am much more familiar with housing legislation, where the importance is placed on the local authority’s ability to allocate housing, rather than a child’s need for a home. A family can be made homeless despite the fact that people will say that the child has a right to a home and the welfare of the child has to be considered. The issue is therefore one of sequencing and of what comes first, whether that concerns how the parents became homeless or the need of the child for a house. These are difficult issues, and there are competing rights and responsibilities. However, different priorities have to be set in different areas, and it is right that the priorities and sequence with which the courts should consider the different factors are set down in the legislation.
Underlying a lot of this, as the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome and the hon. and learned Member for Harborough commented, are qualms about what actually happens to young people in the criminal justice system. I not only share their concerns, but probably take a more oppositionist stance than either of them, because I have profound concerns about how some young people are treated and think that wholesale changes are needed. Those failings are failings of administration, procedure and systems and are not so much the result of the legislation.
For example, there were profound failings in the work of the Home Office monitor in the case of Gareth Myatt, the case that I am most aware of. The Home Office monitor said that he found it very hard to challenge the decisions that were taken by the management of the secure training centre. What is the point of having a Home Office monitor if they cannot challenge the decisions that are being taken? That, at least, is supposed to be one of their functions. There are supposed to be reports on each incident of restraint. I find it hard to believe that all those reports were done—if they were, there might be between 3,000 and 4,000 reports every year, which I defy anyone to deal with.
I have much more profound concerns about the whole regime of restraint, which is horrific and under-reported with regard to injuries. I know a young man, a constituent, who was repeatedly subjected to the nose distraction technique in one of the secure training centres. He only went to hospital when he went to the next institution because of the damage that had been done to his nose. That is an ongoing case that I have just written to the Department about. There are major issues that are not the result of the welfare considerations taken at sentencing, but concern the failures of the system once the young people get into the institutions.
The level of scrutiny that applies to the approval of restraint regimes is also partly our job. It is in our own gift, as a Parliament, to take the Government to task over the statutory instruments that provide for the current system of restraint. The Liberal Democrats, in fact, were responsible for getting the debate in another place. The Government could have been overturned on that, but were not. One could say that that was partly a failure of parliamentary scrutiny. There are issues about how all the restraint techniques were put together and approved. The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome would not change one whit of that.
When we talk about how we will make things better for these young people and deal with the appalling record of recidivism, we also need to consider carefully what happens in some of these institutions. The Government and others who support them say in their defence that the children and young people are well looked after and that their welfare is being protected, just as the hon. Gentleman would want.
I have not been to as many secure training centres or seen as many institutions as some Opposition members of the Committee, but a young person came with me when I went to Rainsbrook and, interestingly, her response was very different from mine. The young people in Rainsbrook looked better than they did outside. I met one of my constituents there and, knowing where that young man came from, I am not surprised that he looked better because it was probably the first time in his life that he had had three meals a day and got to bed on time. However, what he learnt about behaviour in an institution where restraint was used with the frequency that it was in Rainsbrook was probably negative. He would have learnt that ultimately the sanction is force, which he probably knew before he went in and on which basis he would continue to operate after he left. We need to do some profound thinking about the regimes, but the amendment will not alter that.
To make the provisions of the amendment a primary concern in the criminal justice system would be to let the social welfare system off the hook completely and the prime responsibility for the tragedy of these young people’s lives is that intervention is much too late. It should happen much earlier. All of us know that most of the young people who end up in these institutions are a slow-motion disaster that we can all see coming, as we have all tracked them through the system. For example, a young girl at a special needs school was picked up for shoplifting, kept in a police station overnight and progressed from one thing to another until she ended up in Holloway. I have a sneaking suspicion that if there had been a more substantial, thought-through, considered intervention very much earlier, that disaster might not have happened. There are hundreds of kids like that.
Let us get the child services in place to intervene early on, quite toughly if needs be. Once children have committed crimes and go to court, it is right to reassure wider society that the offending behaviour will be the courts’ prime concern, but we must look after the welfare of the child. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Minister will not now jump up and say he will accept the wording in the amendment.
I think that the general public understand that the lives of most of these kids are a disaster and a tragedy and they would not want them to be treated badly. I had nothing but supportive comments from my constituents after I dealt with the Gareth Myatt case, as they understood that what had happened to that young person was wrong. Equally, they would want the kind of behaviour that leads a young person to be given an ASBO to be dealt with.
Although I have enormous regard for the points being made and for the organisation behind the amendments, we need to ensure that we deal with the offending behaviour as well as dealing with the welfare of the young person while they are in the court system. We must try to ensure that we break the appalling cycle of repeat offending and disadvantage, which is what takes these children round and round the revolving doors of the criminal justice system, until they do something really horrible and end up with a long sentence in an adult prison. On that basis, I oppose the amendment.

David Howarth: There are two main differences between the amendment and the clause as it stands. One is the matter that the hon. Member for Northampton, North just referred to, which is the primary regard of the system. The other is the purposes of sentencing. I want to mention a couple of points on each issue.
On the first issue, perhaps the difference between the two versions of the clause is not as great as the hon. Lady suggested. It is not in the interests of a young person, in terms of their welfare and well-being, to be an offender. The amendment would introduce broader considerations alongside that fundamental consideration. I do not think that anybody believes that allowing a young person to remain in a state where they repeatedly offend can possibly be in their interests.
My second point concerns the purpose of sentencing. The difference between the amendment and the existing clause is that the amendment would miss out the punishment of offenders as the first mention of the purpose of sentencing, but it would leave in the other three purposes: the protection of the public, the reform and rehabilitation of offenders and the making of reparation by offenders.

David Hanson: This goes to the nub of the differences between us. Does the hon. Gentleman feel that the 64 young people who are currently in offender institutions because of the crime of murder should not be punished?

David Howarth: The question is whether there is any point to punishment that is not protecting the public, reforming or rehabilitating, or making reparation. In the cases referred to by the hon. Gentleman, presumably the public are being protected. That is presumably why the young people have been sentenced in the way that they have. No one is arguing that the protection of the public aspect of sentencing should be removed, and it would be wrong for the Minister to suggest that that is part of what we are saying. The protection of the public is in the amendment. What is not in the amendment is punishment that does none of those other three things. What is the point of punishment that does not protect the public, that does not rehabilitate and that does not repair the damage?

David Hanson: The amendment tabled by the hon. Gentleman would remove clause 9(4)(a). I take the view, as I think my hon. Friends would, that whatever the circumstances regarding reoffending, the need to protect the public and reparations required of offenders, there has to be an element of punishment for those individuals who have committed crimes—in some cases horrendous crimes of murder. If the hon. Gentleman takes his case to the general public and argues that the murderers of Jamie Bulger should not be punished as well as rehabilitated, he will find himself on the wrong side of the argument with the public at large.

David Howarth: The question is what the purpose is of punishment. The purpose of punishment in those cases is the protection of the public. For the Minister to suggest that Opposition Members favour murder, which is what he seems to think, is absurd. All we are saying is that it is for the Government to say what the point of a punishment is, not to refer to what other people might think, but what the Government and Labour Members themselves believe to be the purpose of punishments that do not fulfil any of the other three functions.

Alun Michael: During the course of sentencing I was always primarily focused on the three elements that the hon. Gentleman mentioned; in other words, on having a constructive purpose to the decision that is taken. However, if he takes the trouble to ask young offenders, including some of the most difficult and prolific offenders in the land, whether they think that there should be punishment when something wrong is done, he will discover that he is in a very small minority in suggesting that punishment should be cast to one side as not relevant. He is making a mistake.

David Howarth: I would be glad to be in a minority of young offenders, although I am not a young offender, as I hope that the hon. Gentleman will realise. The question is still for him to ask—[ Interruption. ]

Alun Michael: No, the hon. Gentleman has missed the point.

Nicholas Winterton: Order.

David Howarth: The hon. Gentleman should not refer to what other people believe, but he should answer as a sentencer what the point of a sentence would be that did not protect, repair or rehabilitate; it does not have to be all three of those things, but at least one.

Alun Michael: I was making the point that those who commit offences understand full well that there will be, and expect there to be, a punishment. Young offenders can be among those who are the most critical of their friends if they commit offences. In the wider scheme of things, to follow what the hon. Gentleman is saying, it would have to be shown that a specific decision leads to prevention, whereas, the general fact that there is punishment is important in creating an environment in which it is understood that there is cause and consequence, and that a punishment follows offending.

David Howarth: The purpose, ultimately, is to protect the public. The hon. Gentleman is reading more into the clause than is there; it is still part of the purpose of the sentence to protect the public in those circumstances. The fundamental point is that one of the things that stands out about British society compared with almost all of the rest of the world, except, perhaps, the United States, is the profound degree of punitiveness that characterises our society, as we have heard today. What do we make of that? What do we do about that as policy makers?
The irony is that one of the clearest causes of crime in a young offender’s background is having been subject to a punitive parenting style. The same characteristic that makes our society punitive is the one that generates, in large measure, the crime that we are trying to prevent.

Sally Keeble: Will not the hon. Gentleman accept that he is confusing punishment with some kind of physical chastisement or more severe sanction? It seems perfectly logical that if society sets boundaries beyond which people are not supposed to go, the most obvious one being murdering people, someone who breaches those must receive a sanction. Wider society expects that in order for it to be confident in the criminal justice system. A young person will only learn how to behave if they understand that if they go beyond that boundary, there will be a sanction of some sort. We are not a particularly punitive society. Our penalties are probably less severe than in the majority of other countries.

David Howarth: I am afraid that research is against the hon. Lady. We do not have a clause saying that the purpose of sentencing is sentencing. The courts impose sanctions on people; the question is what the purpose of that activity is. Our clause meets the requirements of putting forward purposes for sanction. It makes no sense to say that the purpose of punishment is punishment. That is ultimately what our amendment alters in the Bill.

David Burrowes: I speak to amendments Nos. 135 and 9, tabled in my name and those of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough and my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip-Northwood.
We could debate the purpose and principles of sentencing at length. But it is also important to look at the practical reality of the impact on the courts. The statutory duties to prevent offending were explicit in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. For the first time, a duty to prevent offending was imposed not just on the courts but on all those involved in the criminal justice system, which included practitioners and solicitors. It meant that those solicitors who were defending their clients and acting in their best interests also had a primary duty to prevent them offending. That was a good duty and it is repeated in clause 9. The clause also repeats the purpose of sentencing, which is aligned to those purposes relating to over-18s. That is quite proper. The principle that justice should be the same and should be seen to be achieved both in relation to the victim and the offender, regardless of age, is right.

David Hanson: May I give the hon. Gentleman the same opportunity that I gave the hon. Member for Cambridge? In seeking to amend the clause, does he think that people who have murdered and are currently residing in youth offender institutions should not have punishment as part of the purpose of their sentence?

David Burrowes: I am grateful for that intervention. It is probably one of the easiest ones that I have had from the Minister. Of course the answer is yes— [ Interruption. ] If I can complete my reply, it depends on the context in which we look at the purposes and whether the purposes need to have a focus and need to underlie the sentencing regime. The implicit point of any sanction is punishment. The point of prisons is punishment. If the argument put forward to rebut the amendment is that removing punishment as a purpose of sentencing inevitably mean removing prisons, that is obviously not so—prisons are there to punish as much as any other sanctions in the court system. The important point when one looks at punishment is to look at what it achieves and at what sentencing, which in its very nature is punishment, achieves.

Sally Keeble: We can get very involved in semantics here. How would the hon. Gentleman explain to one of his constituents that punishment pure and simple is not required to ensure that people have confidence in the criminal justice system? There are all the other worthy things too. But when he is dealing with a constituent who is a victim of crime how will he explain away the idea that punishment means punishment?

David Burrowes: The way to answer that is very simple. Punishment obviously forms an inherent part of the criminal justice system. The purpose of this amendment was to probe whether we are achieving the purposes of sentencing on the ground. We need to focus on those areas of reform and rehabilitation of offenders and the protection of the public. We also need to look at the context in which offenders come to court and how they are dealt with in family courts. There is reference to acting in the children’s best interests. Many clients come through to the youth courts. Are the social welfare gaps that the hon. Lady described being plugged by the youth courts? Unless such children come within the statutory definition of a child in need, there are often gaps in that system which are not dealt with properly.
Often a case will involve a young person with special educational needs or family issues such as abuse in the home or housing needs. If they come before the court for, perhaps, a more serious offence but the courts are keen to deal with matters speedily, particularly given the present guidelines for speedy justice, the reality is often that the background of the offending is not properly considered in depth. Often, all the needs of a child attending court for the first time are not taken into account and properly considered, and the effect is limited.
When discussing sentencing and justice, we need to take account of reparation. That is the purpose of amendment No. 9. The courts often give limited attention to reparation. On earlier clauses, we had debates about restorative justice and the progress and improvements that have been made, but unless restorative justice involves not just conferencing and challenging offenders’ behaviour and their relationship to victims, and unless that is seen in relation to proper restitution and making of amends, its effects will be limited. That is why the amendment seeks to include in proposed new subsection (1)(4)(d) the words
“financial compensation or other appropriate”
before the words
“reparation by offenders to persons affected by their offences.”
The reality is that the number of financial compensation orders made in youth courts is limited. The latest figures, which are for 2005, suggest that 22,511 orders were imposed, but there are no centrally collected figures to indicate how many were enforced and collected.
Many people consider that basic justice should involve people paying for their crime and properly making amends, but they do not see that as the reality. For example, offenders who commit property or shoplifting crime do not accept that there are any victims. The horrible expression “victimless crime” has come into common parlance but it is something that one should treat with great caution. The concern is that offenders who commit such offences do not understand that they properly need to make amends for their crime.
Let us take the example of a prolific burglar who committed robberies in the Enfield area. When he got into robbing local petrol stations, he did not see a victim. As far as he was concerned, petrol stations were fair game. He considered them to be part of an institution and not bodies with which the concept of victim could be associated. He certainly did not think that he should make any amends. The sentences that he received during the years of his criminal life did not truly require him to pay back the victims of his criminal behaviour.
We have all spoken about reparation. The purpose of amendment No. 9 is to make the point explicitly that it must include financial compensation or other appropriate reparation. That crucial element must become a reality. I ask the Minister to explain how the justice system will ensure that reparation means what it says and involves the financial compensation that many victims often want.
We have discussed welfare issues, which are already a statutory duty, and the suggestion that we should extend the duty to well-being, and broaden the issues of which the court needs to take account with regard to children. But the general concern of the public in respect of the justice system is that victims are not included in discussions on sentencing. The public want people to pay for their crime, and they often want financial payment. It is important for there to be reality in the purpose of sentencing, which is why we tabled the amendment.

Charles Walker: I have been in this place for two and a half years and I still do not have a clue how to navigate my way around a Bill. Proposed new subsection (1)(4)(d) refers to
“the making of reparation by offenders to persons affected by their offences.”
It is important that people in our communities see that those young people responsible for making their lives miserable and for destroying the environment in which they live are making financial reparation for the harm and offence that they have caused. Like many hon. Members, I attend public meetings at churches and community halls in which we discuss antisocial behaviour. There is a strong desire among the public for financial reparation.
As I said on Second Reading, when a group of youngsters are caught smashing up a bus shelter for the first time, they must pay for the repair of that bus shelter. I note that the provision refers to the making of reparation by offenders
“to persons affected by their offence.”
It should refer to persons and organisations. The bus shelter would be owned by an organisation. If the youngsters smashed up the bus shelter a second time, they should pay for the repair—although it would probably be their parents who pay—and receive a fine. In the case of it being smashed up a third time, the youngsters and their parents should appear together at the magistrates court. It is not on for young people to be recidivist offenders without their parents taking an interest in them and the reason behind their actions.

Sally Keeble: The hon. Gentleman has particularly strong views about violence against women with which I agree absolutely. I also agree with him about reparation for minor crimes, but is that acceptable for major crimes such as violence against women? If people say that they are sorry for their actions, does he believe that they should be allowed to go unpunished? Does he accept punitive sentencing?

Charles Walker: The hon. Lady draws me into a completely different area. People who commit violence against others should be incarcerated, so that they do not continue to pose a risk to law-abiding members of society. While they are incarcerated, the underlying cause of their violent behaviour should be addressed, be it their addictions, their mental illness or whatever.
As for youth offending, it is important that, when culprits are identified, they are not just given a warning and told not to do it again. They must be made responsible for their actions. Parents must also be made responsible for the actions of their children. If my children were caught smashing up the local bus shelter—and I hope to God that they would never do such a thing—and I was told that it would cost me £500 to repair it, I would make damn sure that they did not do it a second time. The Bill must allow for that to happen and place responsibility on parents for the actions of young children. Until they take an interest, we will not get to the bottom of the problem.

Nicholas Winterton: Before I call the Minister, I say to the hon. Member for Broxbourne that a learned Clerk is sitting on my left, and the Department of the Clerk of the House is here to help all hon. Members. If he wants to be shown around a Bill, I assure him that those in the Department can lead him a merry dance.

Edward Garnier: I want to intervene briefly because the sedentary chatter that has been going on might have disturbed the general direction of the debate. I do not want to appear more pompous than I am usually. Many hon. Members will find that impossible.
However, I wanted to try to draw us back to the purpose of the Bill and the purpose of this particular debate. I do not think that we need to get over-excited about the points that have been made by people from sedentary positions, when they say, “Oo-er, you have removed the word ‘punishment’”; that is a given. It seems to me that the purpose of tabling this amendment and having this debate is to ensure that we realise that the system is not just about punishment but about disposing of young offenders’ crimes with greater purpose. I do not think that that can be controversial; I am sure that the new Labour party is very keen on punishment nowadays. I am also sure that we all agree that punishment is a necessary part of the criminal justice system.
However, we need to stress that punishment by itself is not enough. The Minister and I have had debates about this issue, in relation to custody. Sending somebody to prison and doing nothing more is not enough; giving someone a young offenders institution sentence and doing nothing more is not enough; sending someone to a secure training centre and doing nothing more is not enough. I suspect that the purpose of the amendment is to get us to engage our thoughts about the whole breadth of purpose of the sentencing system.
I would have thought that those views are utterly uncontroversial. We all know that, even if this matter were pressed to a Division, the Government would have their day. So what? I think that we can be a bit more grown-up about what we are discussing. Let us enjoy the fun of the late Thursday afternoon and tease each other about whether the word “punishment” is in or out, but let us also be serious about what we are trying to achieve and let us hope that no Government Minister will concentrate too much on what he thinks is a good debating point and instead concentrates on the substance of the issue.

Alun Michael: The hon. and learned Member for Harborough has tried to row back from some of the discussion that has been going on in this debate today. However, it is very important indeed that we recollect something that has been referred to in this debate; that it is the purpose of the criminal justice system, particularly in relation to young offenders, to prevent reoffending. If a youngster offends, there is damage to the victim, whoever that is, to the wider community, very often to the offender’s parents and family, and certainly to the offender themselves, in terms of their future prospects. So it is in nobody’s interests that there should be reoffending.
However, in seeking to discourage offending and reoffending, it is very important indeed that the message gets across that if someone offends they will get punished. [Interruption.]

Nicholas Winterton: Order.

Alun Michael: It is that message that Opposition Members sought to resile from in this amendment. I think that they may have muddled themselves; they may not have intended to do that. However, that is what they did.
It is also important, when deciding on the individual sentence and how a youngster is punished, that other decisions are taken that will help to get the youngster out of a pattern of offending and that they are taken constructively. That is why the provision in the Crime and Disorder Act 1988 was put in place, and a very wise one it was, if I may say so.
Opposition Members need to recognise that it is important, from the point of view of offenders or possible offenders, and also from the point of view of the public, in terms of their confidence in the criminal justice system, that we do not put the line through the word “punishment”. It is not the same as the word “punitive”. The word “punitive” means punishment that is excessive in relation to the offence, and punitive measures are not terribly constructive in helping to prevent reoffending. I think that Opposition Members, in instigating this debate, have simply demonstrated that they are a bit muddled about the English language.

David Burrowes: It is important to have a grown-up debate about these important issues. I heard the right hon. Gentleman say that he was concerned that the criminal justice system should prevent reoffending. The amendment seeks to include reoffending, but no one is suggesting that anyone, in any part of the House, wants to put in place measures that will make it easier to reoffend. We are almost getting into a debate over whether to include a phrase saying that we are against that certain principle. He seems to want to make it clear in the clause specifically that we want to stop reoffending.

Alun Michael: I am glad that the hon. Gentleman has had the opportunity to clarify his position.

David Howarth: Is not an alternative view of the meaning of punitive, that it is punishment that does not have a purpose? The amendment is trying to make it clear that punishment should have a purpose.

Alun Michael: I do not think that that is the case. I think that that is a gross over-simplification. Punitive means a punishment that is excessive and inappropriate. That is the simple definition.

David Hanson: I am grateful to have had this debate. I fear that I will disappoint the hon. and learned Member for Harborough in my response. The issue is not about having a childish debate. These are very serious issues. I have looked at the amendment and at the clause. I am a simple man and have been here for only 15 years. I still occasionally look at Bills and decide how we can amend them, just as the hon. Member for Broxbourne has done after two and a half years in this House.
It is clear to me that under the clause, the words “the punishment of offenders” are there as the first purpose of sentencing. That is associated with the issues on which we all have some agreement, such as that we must reform and rehabilitate offenders, protect the public and seek reparation. Simple man though I am, I look at the amendment and see that the first purpose of sentencing is
“the reform and rehabilitation of offenders”.
The words from the Bill—“the punishment of offenders”—are not present.
The amendment was tabled by the hon. Members for Somerton and Frome and for Cambridge, the hon. and learned Member for Harborough, the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate and the hon. Member for Ruislip-Northwood, who has just come in and has missed a very interesting debate. I congratulate the hon. Members for Broxbourne and for Kettering for not putting their names to the amendment. I think they will find that that will curry favour with their constituents at some point.
I am astonished, rather like my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North and my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth. There needs to be an element of punishment. There needs to be an element of boundary also, but there must be some consideration that there will be punishment. Whatever well-meaning words the Committee has heard, the amendment does not put in the words that the purpose of sentencing is “the punishment of offenders”. It would delete those words.
I simply say to the Committee that I hope that the Liberal Democrat Members press the amendment to a Division because I know that my hon. Friends will take great pleasure in voting against it. I do not ask them to withdraw it, but challenge them to put it to a Division. Let us see what the Committee thinks of that motion.

David Burrowes: The Minister interestingly put a primacy on the function of punishment. Does he put it ahead of paragraphs (b), (c) and (d)?

David Hanson: Punishment is important. The first point should be punishment. We need to look at rehabilitation and the prevention of reoffending, but ultimately, I can only defend to my constituents that an element of punishment is—[ Interruption. ]
 David Howarth rose—

Nicholas Winterton: Order. We have been sitting for nearly three hours and I have been in the Chair for three hours. Personally, I believe that this debate has been taken as far as it should have been taken, but I am the servant of the Committee. I advise the Committee that if it goes on much longer, I will suspend proceedings because I believe that three hours of debate without any break is long enough. I warn the Committee that quite shortly I shall suspend proceedings for at least 10 minutes.

David Hanson: I hope to complete my remarks before the stroke of 4 o’clock at the very latest.

David Howarth: Will the Minister give way?

David Hanson: I would rather complete my remarks, if I may?

David Howarth: This is a serious point about the legal interpretation of the clause, to get away from the politics and back to how the courts will read the clause. The Minister was just saying that the clause should be read in order, so that an aim that comes first is more important that an aim that comes afterwards, and that is a hierarchy. For the sake of Pepper v. Hart, was that the interpretation of the clause that the Minister intends?

David Hanson: All aspects of clause 9(4) are important, but I emphasise that the punishment of offenders is equally important. If the amendment is passed, that will not be in the Bill. I want to see the prevention of reoffending, the protection for the public and reparations. However, I also want individuals to know that they will be punished for the crimes that they undertake, particularly serious crimes. I can concur no more than with the statement:
“The purpose of punishing criminals is to deter crime and to send a clear signal that it is wrong.”
That is from the Conservative party’s 2005 manifesto. The signal that the amendment would send on the purpose of sentencing would be entirely the wrong signal.
A couple of other points were made during the debate. My hon. Friend the Member for Leyton and Wanstead suggested raising the age to 19. I think that that would confuse matters and respectfully tell him that I cannot concur with it. Doing so would confuse the courts by crossing the established boundary between youths and adults in youth offending.
Some hon. Members have also mentioned the question of reparation. I do not consider that financial or other compensation needs to be directly referenced in the Bill. If hon. Members look at section 1(30) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, they will see that courts already have a separate power to order any offender to pay compensation.

Charles Walker: All I suggested was the making of reparation by offenders to persons affected by their offences. Would the Minister consider adding, “persons and organisations”?

David Hanson: I will reflect on that. That is an amendment that the hon. Gentleman could have brought forward.
I say to the hon. Member for Cambridge with regard to new clause 14, that, while we have had a gentle debate around the issues of the initial amendment, I accept that it might be worth while including the words “including reoffending” in the Bill. I will reflect on that and potentially bring back a clause or amendment on Report.
I hope that the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome will put amendment No. 135 to the Committee, because I know that my hon. Friends would be grateful for the opportunity to vote on it.

David Heath: We have had a debate that was in part constructive and sensible and in part deeply depressing for its unoriginality and preoccupation. I had hoped that we might have had a sensible debate about the purposes of sentencing and a proper consideration of the attitudes that the Government have clearly expressed many times on how to deal with the child. The hon. Members for Leyton and Wanstead and for Northampton, North certainly touched on that.
The hon. Member for Northampton, North did not agree with the terms of my amendment, and I accept that. She said, quite rightly, that the matters that I wanted to ensure were taken into account before the point of going to court and that there is a much greater duty on the agencies that deal with the child before they come into the criminal justice system and on the penal system after sentence than we sometimes understand or recognise. I do not disagree with her at all. I simply say that the court is a convenient point at which stock take can be taken of all the things that should have been done by those agencies. Using the sentencing procedure and bringing it into the same context as the process that occurs in the family courts is an opportunity to see whether the right support is being given to that individual for the purposes of preventing reoffending and protecting the public. That is what the penal system is all about.
After what was quite a sensible debate on that, we had this absurdity of deciding whether the purpose of punishment had to be punishment. What a nonsense of a debate. Labour Members were saying that they wanted the first principle of punishment to be punishment. It was as if the purpose of the Bill was to make a Bill. If that was the way that the short title started I would be right to say that those words should be deleted. The purpose of sentencing is punishment because sentencing is punishment. As we say in amendment No. 135, sentencing is to ensure a proportionate response to offending behaviour. A sentence is not exerted unless it is punishment, but that punishment must have purpose. The present Prime Minister used to say when he was Chancellor, “prudence with a purpose.” Everything must have a purpose. What we are trying to establish is the purpose of punishment and sentencing. That is why I so deplore the way in which we have descended into such a futile debate, simply because some thought that they might be able to secure some petty political advantage. I have not got the slightest intention of prolonging this debate any further. I find it very sad that we cannot have a serious debate about the purposes of sentencing in this Committee without people making utterly futile points. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Hon. Members: No.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 2, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived.

Nicholas Winterton: The way in which the Committee has been debating in the past few minutes indicates that a three-hour sitting may be a little bit too long.

Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Further consideration adjourned.—[Mr. Khan.]

Adjourned accordingly at four minutes past Four o’clock till Tuesday 20 November at half-past Ten o’clock.